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ABSTRACT 
 Patron-clientelism or wasta in Jordan is a historically engrained institution that 
crosses social, political and economic spheres. For those with sufficient resources to enter 
into its system of exchange, patron-clientelism grants access to university admissions, 
government privileges and employment. For those without sufficient resources, patron-
clientelism creates a barrier to entry that sustains the marginalized status of persons from 
low socio-economic backgrounds. 
 Most scholarship about patron-clientelism portrays it as something dynamic, 
inherently neither morally constructive nor problematic but with the potential to be both. 
By focusing on various historical manifestations of patron-clientelism, such scholarship 
detracts attention from its reprehensible effects. Posing as value-free, this literature 
implicitly apologizes for patron-clientelism and reinforces the entrenched political and 
economic structures it reflects.  
 To step beyond existing literature surrounding patron-clientelism— the 
perpetually expanding but only marginally helpful registry of ways in which it 
manifests— requires deeper consideration of its effect. This thesis will argue that in the 
case of Jordan, patron-clientelism tends to function in the service of dominant 
fundamental social groups and at the expense of subaltern classes. Using Antonio 
Gramsci’s civil society, patron-clientelism in Jordan will be shown to operate as a 
mechanism of authoritarian resiliency and a means of debilitating oppositional political 
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currents. By understanding its existing ramifications in depth, potential for redirecting the 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Late November protests and those witnessed in Jordan last summer1 remind 
observers that reverberations from the Arab Spring continue to shake foundations of 
authoritarianism in the Middle East. Shortcomings of basic models of authoritarian 
governance indicate their weakening resilience and have been met with intensifying 
demands for transparency and accountability. Although defensive democratization— lip 
service to economic and political reform— has helped regimes subdue oppositional 
political currents, unimproved economic circumstances and increasing popular political 
self-consciousness call into question the viability of co-optation strategies as well as the 
longevity of authoritarianism. 
Underlying these simmering tensions in Jordan exists an entrenched network of 
institutions that simultaneously reflect and perpetuate its distinct economic and political 
circumstances. These institutions function in favor of the dominant fundamental social 
groups so as to sustain the status quo and the subalternity of non-dominant groups. This 
has an effect that foments widespread corruption, but more gravely, exclusion of non-
dominant classes from the political process as well as from access to fundamental rights 
and dignity. Patron-clientelism, referred to as wasta in Arabic is the focus of this thesis. It 
                                                        
1 Late November and summer protests refer to those that occurred in 2018.  
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offers a strong example of an institution that reflects the political and economic 
circumstances in Jordan and frustrates efforts to upend them.  
Despite the engrained nature of institutions like patron-clientelism, it is not the 
case that efforts to upend economic and political circumstances that leave subalterns in 
Jordan marginalized are hopeless. Nor is it the case that the political agency attributable 
to institutions like patron-clientelism is impossible to redirect. Rather, as economic 
circumstances worsen these possibilities only become more likely. In order bolster 
prospects of success for oppositional political currents, understanding how institutions 
function in service of the dominant fundamental groups to sustain existing economic and 
political circumstances is necessary.  
But conversations about revolutionary behavior in the Middle East and prospects 
for reconfiguring economic and political circumstances tend to be actor-centric. That is to 
say, they tend to present opportunistic accounts of ways in which revolutionary behavior 
can manifest and how it has the possibility to affect substantial change. An apt example is 
Asef Bayet’s Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East. His 
argument is that social nonmovements, acts of quiet encroachment, street politics and 
inaudible collectives can play a crucial role in instigating political transformation.2 What 
Bayet does not consider in depth, however, are the institutions and norms engrained in 
political, social and economic life that have greater salience in shaping behavior than the 
potential momentum of disconnected, spontaneous and accumulative dissent. This is a 
                                                        
2 A Bayet. Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East. Stanford Press. 2010. p. 15. 
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thematic shortcoming in pre and post-Arab Spring scholarship, but one that is possible to 
rectify. 
Attempts to characterize political and economic circumstances in places like 
Jordan so as to understand strategies of the dominant fundamental groups to sustain 
them— and revolutionary strategy to oppose them— first require space-centric analysis.3 
In other words, one must realize how the process of defending the status quo by dominant 
fundamental groups shapes environments from which dissent might be articulated. This 
necessarily involves consideration of civil society, a notion of political space tracing back 
to Aristotle, which in the broadest terms is understood as an environment involving 
associations and non-governmental organizations with political import. Different 
theoreticians have presented conflicting definitions of civil society, but one with the 
greatest value for the discussion at hand— and one who will provide the theoretical 
backbone for this thesis— is Antonio Gramsci.  
As will be developed further, Gramsci viewed civil society as a realm interrelated 
with political society (government) with the potential to either complement or oppose 
political leadership by the dominant fundamental groups. It is the sphere in which dissent 
to existing relations of hegemony can be articulated in order that consent to the dominant 
fundamental groups be redirected. Civil society, understood on the basis of political 
agency attributable to institutions within it, reflects the influence and interests of Jordan’s 
dominant fundamental groups— ie. the monarchy, the political elite, influential tribes, 
                                                        
3 Space-centric analysis relates to consideration of how environments shape political behavior. In the case 
of Jordan this relates to the way civil society either empowers dissent or solidifies existing political and 
economic structures.  
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etc. On the other hand, civil society in Jordan also represents a space from which the 
possibility for re-education emerges, so that a culture critical of existing economic and 
political circumstances can be cultivated and hegemonic reconfiguration can be realized.  
Equally important alongside any conversation involving Gramsci’s civil society is 
consideration of the cultural frame of mind institutions like patron-clientelism solidify in 
support of the dominant fundamental groups. In other words, greater understanding is 
needed for ideas and norms people associate with the political process in Jordan because 
of their entrenchment in institutions like patron-clientelism. Understanding the general 
popular frame of mind toward politics, manipulated by fundamental groups so as to 
sustain their dominance, is essential in order to realize how these ideas can be redirected 
so as to enable reconfiguration of economic and political circumstances.  
This registry of needs for greater understanding of institutions and their effects on 
the political process in Jordan represents, in broad terms, the intellectual context from 
which this thesis emerges. Having presented some of the key themes to be addressed 
here, the more concrete attributes and methodology of this thesis need introduction. 
Foremost, here, is acknowledgement that this thesis offers primarily political theory 
analysis. It does not pretend to emphasize a comprehensive study of Jordan, but rather 
uses political theory to introduce new ways of understanding political, economic and 
social life in Jordan. Vice-versa, it also uses circumstances in Jordan to help illuminate a 
novel development of Gramscian theory. The purpose for this is two-fold. In the first, 
case-study literature surrounding patron-clientelism in Jordan accounts for the bulk of 
existing scholarship. Offering further case-study analysis would not provide an especially 
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novel approach to the field. Secondly, theory-based analysis helps explain why and to 
what effect patron-clientelism exists as a salient factor in social, political and economic 
life in Jordan, stepping beyond the simple and existing registry of ways in which it 
manifests. 
The fundamental premise of this thesis is that patron-clientelism4 is an institution 
that functions to sustain existing relations of hegemony in Jordan, leadership of the ruling 
elite and subalternity of non-dominant groups. The position espoused by this thesis is that 
current prevalent manifestations of patron-clientelism in Jordan, on one hand exclude 
people from political and economic life who do not have the resources required for 
entrance into patron-client relations; this sustains the marginalized status of subaltern 
groups. On the other hand, patron-clientelism debilitate prospects for popular contestation 
of political and economic circumstances by solidifying in the minds of Jordanians ideas 
and norms related to how the political process is imagined to function. In order for 
political and economic change to be effective in Jordan, patron-clientelism and other 
institutions operative in civil society in support of Jordan’s existing dominant 
fundamental groups must be dismantled and redirected.  
Contemporary scholarship surrounding patron-clientelism would disagree with 
the notion that patron-clientelism in Jordan is unequivocally harmful. It argues, generally 
speaking, that the manifestations of patron-clientelism are diverse and dynamic; and so, 
where patron-clientelism exists as a problematic in particular places and times, elsewhere 
                                                        
4 The relationship between someone who has authority, status, wealth or some other personal resource and 
someone else who benefits from their support or influence in exchange for payment, favors or loyalty. 
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it might be constructive. While it is true and there are prospects for redirecting the 
trajectory of political agency attributable to patron-clientelism and other institutions 
operative in civil society in Jordan, the shortcoming of this position is that it avoids 
making concrete value statements that identify moral wrongs when and where they exist. 
It is the position of this thesis that current manifestations of patron-clientelism in Jordan 
reflect a moral wrong and any scholarship about patron-clientelism that does not 
condemn its harmful expressions makes an apology for them.  
Following a literature review, the third chapter of this thesis will argue that 
scholarship about politics necessarily carries with it an either explicit or implicit value 
judgements. Marx’s comments on moral objectivity will be used to develop a barometer 
supportive of claims that patron-clientelism in Jordan represents a moral wrong. The third 
chapter is intended to demonstrate a kind of self-consciousness reflected by this thesis, an 
awareness of how it would see itself in relation to other scholarship and the moral 
argument it hopes to persuasively present. Also important in this section will be a brief 
reflection on the role of intellectuals and education in either serving existing 
arrangements of political and cultural hegemony or opposing them. 
The fourth chapter of this thesis provides in-depth analysis of Antonio Gramsci’s 
civil society so as to build conceptual understanding for the role of patron-clientelism in 
Jordanian civil society. The fundamental argument of this section is that civil society is 
characterized more so on the basis of political agency attributable to operative institutions 
and relations within it than on the basis of its distinction or location apart from political 
society. This also will be important to develop the idea that patron-clientelism not only 
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reflects the nature of civil society, but also overarching cultural hegemony in Jordan. 
Themes from Gramsci to advance this argument relate to the complexity of civil 
society— that is, the essential value of understanding complexity in civil society in order 
to understand how fundamental groups use civil society to reinforce their dominance. 
Necessity of unification and universalization is the second key theme which is used to 
explain the role of organic intellectuals to expand interests beyond their corporate origins 
and affect substantial change. Here a look at Gramsci’s comments on the Italian south 
will be helpful to suggest certain types of economic circumstances lead themselves to 
certain types of societal organization and the prominence of particular organizing factors 
over others. The third theme will relate to the cultivation of a critical culture and means 
through which existing hegemonic configurations can be challenged. 
The fifth chapter will attempt to bring all conceptual themes from preceding 
chapters together with vignettes descriptive of Jordan’s economic circumstance and the 
effects of manifestations of patron-clientelism in Jordan. These will center primarily on 
the role of patron-clientelism within Jordan’s education system, how it relates to Jordan’s 
economic circumstance, debilitates civil society and empowers the ruling elite. This 
section will also make the argument that opportunity exists for the redirection of patron-
clientelism so that instead of supporting the dominant fundamental groups in Jordan it 
can be used to champion the subaltern classes and affect overarching bottom-up 
economic and political change. 
This is the roadmap for the following pages. If done right, this thesis should 
demonstrate why prevalent manifestations of patron-clientelism present an unequivocal 
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moral wrong in Jordan. It should also show how patron-clientelism sustains the 
marginalized status of subaltern groups and debilitates prospects for popular contestation 
of existing economic and political circumstances. Then, armed with a clearheaded 
understanding of how patron-clientelism undermines civil society and contributes to 
authoritarian resiliency, it will present means of redirecting patron-clientelism so that 
meaningful political and economic change in the interests of marginalized groups can be 
affected.  
As a final brief methodological note, this thesis emerged from unsophisticated 
beginnings. It started as a broad inquiry directed toward whomever the present author 
was able to conversationally engage in bars and coffee shops around Amman, Jordan. 
Introductory questions usually involved the following: ‘how do politics in Jordan serve 
your interests?’ and ‘how do politics in Jordan fall short of meeting your interests?’ After 
repeated interlocutors made mention of wasta, the focus of questioning in subsequent 
conversations shifted toward how wasta manifest in their lives, either as a source of 
empowerment or frustration.  
These informal interviews were then supplemented by research of a more 
scholarly nature and subjects like wasta, nepotism and, later, patron-clientelism were 
explored thoroughly using sources such as Google and Google Scholar. Much of the 
literature about wasta seemed to indicate that its processes, although having undeniable 
links to government, were expressed most prominently in society. This brought 
immediately to mind Antonio Gramsci’s civil society and led to a close reading of his 
prison notes and earlier writing.  
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The accumulation of reading about wasta and civil society brought this project to 
its initial form. After submitting one of the earlier drafts in the form of a Statement of 
Intent for PhD candidacy to mentor Alan Gilbert, the urgency for writing from a value-
conscious perspective was realized. This brought into consideration the ideas discussed in 
the third chapter and shaped the pointed nature of writing found more generally in this 
thesis.  
The two interviews relied upon as primary sources in the fifth chapter were 
friends made during the present author’s time in Jordan. Amjad Tadros, as one of the 
founders of Syria Direct, was often in the Amman office and made himself entirely 
accessible for conversations and interviews. Akram Al-Deek became a close personal 
friend of the present author and welcomed long conversations about politics, literature 
and life in Jordan. Both Amjad and Akram were invaluable in the development of what is 
now this thesis. It is the present author’s hope that in addition to making a compelling 















CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A. Patron-Clientelism 
In order to characterize thoroughly the considerable body of literature surrounding 
studies of patron-clientelism in Middle East, both diachronic and synchronic approaches 
to analysis of its scholarship are helpful. Although patron-clientelism (in Arabic: wasta) 
was a phenomenon mentioned in passing by academics as early as the 1960s,5 its first 
substantive study in Middle East Studies was undertaken by Robert Cunningham and 
Yasin Sarayrah in the early 1990s. Reflecting what became a trend in research at the 
time, their focus was the adverse effect of patron-clientelism on internally generated 
economic growth in countries of the Middle East. Their seminal works defined wasta as a 
concept denoting the, “practice of utilizing social networks to attain goals… [and] 
favoritism based on tribal and family affiliation.”6 With regard to the particular 
mechanisms through which goals were attained, wasta was associated with, the act [as 
well as the related actor] of mediation or intercession.7 These ideas were contextualized 
                                                        
5 R Cunningham, Y Sarayrah. Wasta: The Hidden Force in Middle Eastern Society. Praeger Publishers. 
1993. p. 3.  
 
6 S Ali, et al. “Social Capital in Jordan: Wasta in Employment Selection.” The International Conference on 
Organization and Management (ICOM), Abu Dhabi. 2015. 
 
7 R Cunningham, Y Sarayrah. Wasta: The Hidden Force in Middle Eastern Society. Praeger Publishers. 
1993. p. 1-2. 
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with reference to inter-tribal and inter-familial relations, and enunciated with examples 
crossing social, political and economic dimensions. From Cunningham and Sarayrah 
onward, common illustrations of patron-clientelism relate to dispute resolution,8 political 
candidacy,9 betrothal,10 employee selection,11 school admittance12 and procurement of 
government documents or services.13 
Problematizing one directional conceptualization of patron-clientelism, 
subsequent scholarship sought nuanced approaches to register its potentially positive 
effects. For example, in a study of employment selection practices in Jordan authors Ali, 
Raiden and Kirk use a social capital lens to identify six distinct themes associated with 
patron-clientelism: (i) wasta as an enabler to get jobs, (ii) wasta as social ties/ solidarity, 
(iii) wasta as a method to transfer/attain information, (iv) wasta as a guide in decision-
making, (v) wasta as an exchange, (vi) wasta as pressure.14 Their conclusion was that 
because wasta can be divided into different types and processes, and because those types 
                                                        
8 A Mohamed, H Hamdy. “The Stigma of Wasta: The Effect of Wasta on Perceived Competence and 
Morality.” German University in Cairo, Working Paper Series. 2008. 
 
9 M Branin, F Analoui. “Human Resource Management in Jordan.” In Managing Human Resources in the 
Middle East by P Budhwar and K Mullahi. Edward Elgar Publishing. 2006. 
 
10 R Cunningham, Y Sarayrah. Wasta: The Hidden Force in Middle Eastern Society. Praeger Publishers. 
1993. p. 2. 
 
11 M Loewe, et al. “The Impact of Favouritism on the Business Climate: A Study on Wasta in Jordan.” 
German Development Institute. 2007. 
 
12 R Cunningham, Y Sarayrah. Wasta: The Hidden Force in Middle Eastern Society. Praeger Publishers. 
1993. p. 120. 
 
13 A Richards, J Waterbury. A Political Economy of the Middle East, Third Edition. Routledge Publishing. 
2008. p. 328 
 
14 S Ali, et al. “Social Capital in Jordan: Wasta in Employment Selection.” The International Conference 
on Organization and Management (ICOM), Abu Dhabi. 2015. 
    
12 
 
and processes are unequal in moral value, sweeping suggestions about the universally 
problematic nature of patron-clientelism tend to essentialize. They argue that whereas the 
first two categories of wasta in Jordan have the potential to, respectively, privilege 
personal connections over merit and foment exclusionary practices, its other 
manifestations such as information exchange operate on a plane of moral neutrality.  
While continuing to orbit the same argument, scholarship surrounding patron-
clientelism has also evolved by way of expansion beyond the realm of political economy. 
Applying social movement theory to the study of patron-clientelism in the Middle East, 
Janine Clark examines the nature and significance of networks in which Islamic social 
institutions are embedded, as well as the type and behavior of participants within those 
networks. Professor Clark argues that whereas social movements tend to consist of 
horizontal social networks that are homogenous15 and reproducing,16 patron-client 
relationships are unequal and operational through vertical structures. The simplest of 
these relationships, “involve patrons who use their influence and/or resources to provide 
protection and/or benefits to clients who in turn reciprocate by offering support and 
assistance, potentially votes, for example.”17 Clark concludes by noting that, “although 
scholars disagree on whether these relationships serve as a form of social stability 
through vertical integration or as a means of entrenching the class system (in other words, 
                                                        
15 B Klandermans. “The Social Construction of Protests and Multiorganizational Fields.” In Frontiers in 
Social Movement Theory by A Morris and C Mueller. Yale University Press. 1992. 
 
16 D McAdam, R Paulsen. “Specifying the Relationship Between Social Ties and Activism.” American 
Journal of Sociology. 1993. 
 
17 J Clark. “Social Movement Theory and Patron Clientelism: Islamic Social Institutions and the Middle 
Class in Egypt, Jordan and Yemen.” Comparative Political Studies. 2004. p. 946. 
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ensuring that the poor remain poor), they agree that patron-client relations are entered 
freely, with both sides perceiving, at least in the short run, mutual benefit.”18  
On the far side of the discourse alluded to, Aseel Al-Ramahi provides a 
genealogical perspective of wasta, frames it as a culturally bound dispute resolution 
process, and argues on behalf of its benefit for Middle Eastern society. With specific 
reference to the formation of the Hashemite Kingdom, Al-Ramahi outlines Abdullah bin 
Husayn’s arrival to Transjordan in 1920, and the salience of tribal networking in 
economic and political transactions at the time.19 Realizing the value of tribal support for 
any aspirations of rulership, bin Husayn gained favor with tribes by using them to 
channel resources and services originating from the central government. Through this 
process mutual dependence emerged as tribes became reliant on the resources from the 
central government and the legitimacy of the monarchy became contingent upon support 
from tribes. The centrality of wasta in the formation of the Hashemite Kingdom, Al-
Ramahi argues, sewed seeds enabling it to prevail as a convention in Jordan society 
today. Despite increasing repudiation of wasta in the 21st century, Al-Ramahi concludes, 
the Jordanian state and its society have their origins in wasta; because of this, the concept 
is inextricably linked with the country’s future as much as its past.20 Far from 
demonstrating specific positive moral value emanating from manifestations of patron-
                                                        
18 Ibid. 
 
19 M Hammami. “Political Uncertainty, Investment Decisions and Development Policy Implications.” 
Workshop Paper: Research Bank on the World Bank. 2006. 
 
20 A Al-Ramahi. “Wasta in Jordan: A Distinct Feature of (and Benefit for) Middle Eastern Society.” Arab 
Law Quarterly. 2008. 
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clientelism in Jordan, this article seems to at best present a thorough review of its 
historical basis, alongside a vague suggestion that the cultural rootedness of patron-
clientelism implies its future utility.  
Offering a less value-suggestive historical perspective, Alan Richards and John 
Waterbury provide a succinct characterization of the evolution of patron-clientelism in 
the Middle East, with specific reference to its classical and contemporary images. The 
classical example they outline is the landowner who, in a semi-feudal arrangement,  
“Monopolizes in a given locale the most precious fixed asset, land…[and] 
controls access to it. His clients are his tenants, laborers and sharecroppers. He 
protects them… supplies them agricultural inputs and monetary credit, assists 
them if they fall ill… The clients in turn produce for him, supply him free labor, 
vote for him if elections are an issue, and fight for him if he is attacked by 
outsiders.”21  
 
In comparison,  
“Today, with the growth of large bureaucratic states… the patron is more likely to 
be a broker… [of] access to state resources… [or] protect[orate] against various 
forms of state action. He may help procure a birth certificate… [or] help place a 
son in university… [or] swing a loan through the agricultural credit bank. What 
the patron receives in return is somewhat amorphous.”22  
 
While focusing on the roles of patrons, this analysis is helpful because it highlights their 
role as protectorates across time. What Richards and Waterbury omit from their 
discussion is consideration of whether, though mutually beneficial, patron-client 
relationships produce equal benefits for both patrons and clients.   
                                                        
21 A Richards, J Waterbury. A Political Economy of the Middle East, Third Edition. Routledge Publishing. 
2008. p. 328. 
 
22 A Richards, J Waterbury. A Political Economy of the Middle East, Third Edition. Routledge Publishing. 
2008. p. 329. 
    
15 
 
Having confronted the literature surrounding patron-clientelism since its 
introduction into academic consciousness, final consideration requires a look at its place 
in contemporary scholarship. The most recent and significant publication on the subject 
comes from de Elvira et al., who develop the concept of ‘networks of dependency’ to 
characterize the role of patron-clientelism in the Middle East and North Africa. They 
argue that patron-client relationships are “neither static (as a simple pillar of rule of a 
resilient authoritarian regime) nor do they evolve in a linear way, i.e. towards 
strengthening or weakening a political regime.”23 As a research perspective, the 
‘network’ directs attention to the complex, asymmetric and multifaceted character of the 
social relations, while ‘dependency’ implies mutually binding reciprocity and emphasizes 
the often-ignored agency of the client.24 Although from a methods approach the 
application of networks theory to understand patron-client relationships is not novel, the 
perspective of de Elvira et al. is important because it injects nuance into a previously 
dichotomous discourse. Rather than arguing that patron-clientelism is a feature of Middle 
Eastern society with inherently positive or negative effects, they suggest it can be both.  
Pertaining directly to the project at hand, de Elvira et al. also include in their book 
a case study of Jordan, written by Luis Melián Rodríguez, outlining the role of tribes as 
contributors to the resilience of Jordan’s authoritarian system, and how dynamics of 
patron-clientelism have evolved since the Arab Spring. This analysis emphasizes the 
                                                        
23 L Elvira, et al. Clientelism and Patronage in the Middle East and North Africa: Networks of Dependency. 
Routledge Press. 2019. p. 13.  
 
24 L Elvira, et al. Clientelism and Patronage in the Middle East and North Africa: Networks of Dependency. 
Routledge Press. 2019. p. 7. 
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central role played by tribal organizations within the Jordanian monarchy,25 considers 
tribes to be an intermediate structure that functions as patronage brokers and describes 
how this social structure is self-reinforcing, a quality that helps maintain the political 
status quo.26  
With regard to Jordan’s experience during the Arab Spring, protests showed that 
the diminishing of the regime’s distributive capacity had seriously shaken and eroded the 
entrenched foundations of its support.27 However, because protestors did not identify 
tribal leaders as responsible for their impoverishment the structures of patron-clientelism 
situated around tribes remained. With their influence intact, tribal leaders worked to 
block privatization processes they saw interlinked with widespread corruption, warning 
“should the government forge ahead with these kind of policies ‘the immunity enjoyed by 
the monarch might not be extended.’”28 This enabled defensive democratization that side-
stepped substantive change, bolstered authoritarian resiliency and perpetuated existing 
tribal power dynamics.  
Rodríguez’s chapter is important because it provides introductory analysis of how 
patron-client relationships shape politics in the Hashemite Kingdom. It also helps explain 
in tangible terms how patron-clientelism contributes to authoritarian resiliency. Related 
                                                        
25 R Brynen. “The Politics of Monarchical Liberalism: Jordan.” Political Liberalization and 
Democratization in the Arab World, Vol. 2. Lynne Rienner Publishing. 1998. p. 71-100. 
 
26 L Elvira, et al. Clientelism and Patronage in the Middle East and North Africa: Networks of Dependency. 
Routledge Press. 2019. p. 211. 
 
27 Ibid. p. 224. 
 
28 S Helfont, T Helfont. “Jordan: Between the Arab Spring and the Gulf Cooperation Council.” Elsevier 
Limited: Foreign Policy Research Institute. 2012. 
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to this project more generally, this chapter is helpful because, as Rodríguez notes, 
“Jordan has in many respects been neglected by both the international political arena and 
scholarly analysis.”29 
With consideration to both the development and evolution of literature 
surrounding patron-clientelism in the Middle East, as well its position in contemporary 
scholarship, one overarching theme emerges. In almost every case, studies of patron-
clientelism have an actor-centric focus, and usually the actor in question is the patron. 
This is important for understanding how patron-client relationships function and evolve 
but has less relevance for hopes to understand the effects of patron-client relationships on 
spheres of political exchange, or the likelihood of political movements emerging from 
below. In this vein, Rodríguez from the preceding paragraph comes closest to explaining 
how patron-client power dynamics affect political conditioning, but again focus primarily 
on the role of tribes, ie. the patron.  
An opportunity for innovation within this subject of study is a closer examination 
of the bearing of patron-client relationship dynamics on spaces of political 
mobilization— i.e. civil society— and how the exclusionary practices perpetuated by 
patron-client relationships contribute to a broader and more collectively experienced 
debilitation of civil society. Acknowledging the cultural rootedness of wasta in the 
Middle East, this analysis would not serve as a source of value judgement, or to suggests 
its inherently malevolent or benevolent nature. Rather, stepping past the historic debate in 
                                                        
29 L Elvira, et al. Clientelism and Patronage in the Middle East and North Africa: Networks of Dependency. 
Routledge Press. 2019. p. 211. 
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scholarship vis-à-vis patron-clientelism this project will demonstrate that a negative 
moral value can be attributed to prevalent manifestations of patron-clientelism in Jordan 
because they tend to undermine civil society, prevent democratization and contribute to 
authoritarian resiliency. In terms of its focus and method, this is a task yet to be 
undertaken.  
 
B. Civil Society & Antonio Gramsci    
Antonio Gramsci is simultaneously heralded as one of the most innovative and 
obscure political theorists of the 20th century. This makes understanding and attempting 
to appropriately apply his concepts a complex process with considerable reward— if only 
for the feeling of having completed a puzzle most scholars quickly abandon. One of the 
problems associated with reading Gramsci is that his writing is at times incredibly vague, 
with some of his most important concepts left only partially developed.  
With reference specifically to his Prison Notebooks, the reason for this ambiguity, 
or censorship in places where more lucidity might have been possible, can be attributed 
to the circumstances under which Gramsci completed the bulk of his writing: a fascist 
prison cell. When comparing Gramsci’s political writings with the more straightforward 
letters he mailed to his wife and sons, a measure of intentionality can be presumed of his 
vagueness in the former. This creates an alluring sense in readers that a sort of hidden 
message is available within Gramsci’s political writings, if only one is willing to exert the 
requisite effort to discover it. Conceptually, this playfulness and inaccessibility in 
Gramsci’s writings align with his thoughts on education insofar as he believed it should 
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be ‘an assiduous process in which truth is fecund only when one has made an effort to 
master it and reproduced in himself the state of anxiety which the scholar passed through 
before arriving at it.’30 
With regard to uses of Gramsci, an immense body of scholarship has applied his 
concepts in order to explain political circumstances and behavior across the 20th and 21st 
centuries. Among the most significant of scholars to confront Gramsci are Robert Cox, 
Sara Roy, Edward Said and Stuart Hall. What tends to vary between different 
applications of Gramsci, what makes reading Edward Said substantially different from 
reading someone like Robert Cox, is the way in which Gramsci’s concepts and 
methodologies are elucidated. Some ‘Gramscian scholars,’ such as Alastair Davidson, 
like to suggest a sort of range of legitimacy in terms true adherence to Gramsci’s work 
represented by those who study him. Gramsci himself recognized that no theory— even 
Marx’s— could be treated as if the author were a Messiah who had laid down a nostrum 
once and for all,31 so these claims tend to read as arrogant and polemical. A humbler and 
more fruitful digestion of Gramscian scholarship capitalizes and draws insight from their 
varied means of application— the different things different Gramsci scholars do well. 
After discussing the broader ways in which Gramsci has been most prominently applied, 
indicating how these applications inform the process of confronting Gramsci, a close 
discussion of lesser-known scholars’ employment of Gramsci’s civil society will follow.  
                                                        
30 A Gramsci. The Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916-1935. [Edited by D Forgacs.] New 
York University Press. 2000. p. 61-66 
 
31 A Davidson. “The Uses and Abuses of Gramsci.” Sage Journals. 2008. 
 
    
20 
 
Robert Cox repeatedly stated that ‘his work does not purport to be a critical study 
of Gramsci’s political theory but merely a derivation from it of some ideas useful for a 
revision of current international relations theory,’32 and so the benefit of his 
methodological approach exists on the broadest conceptual level. What Cox attempted to 
accomplish in his 1996 article was an extrapolation of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony— 
one of the most referenced of Gramsci’s concepts— in order explain the international 
system. To do this, Cox took what Gramsci said about the Socialist political struggle 
during and around the turn of the 20th century and it applied it to contemporary 
circumstances.33 This was a fruitful endeavor in the sense that it presented in accessible 
terms a Gramscian notion of hegemony— as well as some of Gramsci’s other concepts. 
One could also compliment Cox’s use of the history which Gramsci drew upon to 
expound some of these concepts. For instance, reference to debates within the Third 
International concerning the strategy of the Bolshevik Revolution and the creation of a 
Soviet socialist state.34 These references are important because they, on one hand, 
acknowledge the domestic orientation of Gramsci’s thinking, and on the other, 
extrapolate onto an international field the strategies Gramsci presented as means for 
affecting hegemonic reconfiguration. In a word, Cox’s extrapolation represents a 
development of Gramsci’s hegemony that grows beyond its original conceptual 
                                                        
32 R Cox. “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay on Method.” Millennium: Journal of 




34 R Cox. “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay on Method.” Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies. 1996. 
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presentation. It uses Gramsci as a methodological point of departure such that concepts— 
applied to contemporary circumstances— become elaborated and dynamic in the 
specificity of particular historical moments.   
Also important about Cox’s application is his discussion of the relationship 
between Gramsci and Machiavelli. This is helpful for understanding the nuance with 
which hegemonic configurations exist and also the importance of both consent and 
coercion in pursuit and defense of hegemony. Gramsci’s appreciation for Machiavelli’s 
Prince is presented in relatively concrete terms and centers on ways in which leaders can 
conquer an existing state or cultivate a new type of state.35 Leaders in politics, Gramsci 
indicates, can refer to either an individual or a more or less numerous political body, and 
so the usefulness of Machiavelli can be found in the parallels between strategies 
prescribed for a prince and those for a political party. Cox emphasizes this relationship in 
his discussion of consent and coercion: “The Machiavellian connection frees the concept 
of power (and of hegemony as one form of power) from a tie to historically specific 
social classes and gives it a wider applicability to relations of dominance and 
subordination, including…relations of the world order.”36 What Cox argues here is not 
that Gramsci imagines diminished saliency of class conflict, or diminished relevance of 
one type of power over another. Rather, he astutely describes the nuanced ways 
relationships of domination and subordination can exist and the ways in which (extending 
                                                        
35 A Gramsci. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. [Edited/Translated: Q Hoare, G Smith]. International 
Publishers. 1971. p. 252-253. 
 
36 R Cox. “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay on Method.” Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies. 1996. p. 164. 
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beyond coercion) that domination can be secured. This is instructive for students 
attempting to grasp and apply Gramsci because it reminds them to look beyond static 
notions of hegemony particular to historical circumstance, toward the dynamic ensemble 
of its constitutive relationships: what Gramsci referred to as the “interplay of relations 
between principal groups of the fundamental classes and the auxiliary forces directed by, 
or subjected to, their hegemonic influence.”37 
Sara Roy is one of the few scholars who have branched out beyond Gramsci’s 
concept of hegemony and has done so with specific regard to civil society in the Middle 
East. In her chapter on the Gaza Strip from AR Norton’s book Civil Society in the Middle 
East, Dr. Roy defines two forms in which civil society can be manifest: the liberal 
pluralist model and the Marxist model. The liberal pluralist model is based on democracy 
as the ideal form of government and capitalism as the ideal form of economic 
organization. Within this framework, civil society is “independent of the state but not 
necessarily opposed to it and is assigned primacy as the realm of economic relations 
organized by the marketplace.”38 For her Marxist model, Dr. Roy uses Gramsci to 
suggest civil society as a “weapon against capitalism, not an accommodation to it,”39 the 
sphere of the exploited where the struggle against state domination must be waged.40  
                                                        
37 A Gramsci. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. [Edited/Translated: Q Hoare, G Smith]. International 
Publishers. 1971. p. 222. 
 
38 S Roy. “Civil Society in the Gaza Strip: Obstacles to Social Reconstruction.” In Civil Society in the 
Middle East by A Norton. Brill Publishing. 1996. p. 221-223. 
 
39 E Wood. “The Uses and Abuses of Civil Society.” In Socialist Register: A Survey of Movements and 
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Roy’s insight is important because it draws attention to Gramsci’s strategies for 
“industrially and socially advanced states… where civil society has become a complex 
structure resistant to catastrophic incursions.”41 In advanced states, a dialectical 
relationship exists between political society (ie. the bureaucratic, coercive state 
apparatus) and civil society, wherein the ideologies and interests held by participants in 
the state apparatus are intertwined with and reflected by civil society. In this 
circumstance, the state (political society) is described by Gramsci as only an “an outer 
ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks.”42 All of 
this is to say that in advanced states, direct confrontation with the state apparatus— what 
Gramsci calls a war of maneuver— is difficult, because civil society forms its reinforcing 
and protective element. What Roy alludes to is that in advanced states contests for 
hegemony must occur first in civil society (war of position), as in a war of ideas through 
the manufacturing of consent. Civil society must be toppled in the sense that the 
prevalent ideologies and interests within it— reflective of those attributable to political 
society— are undermined, making way for hegemonic reconfiguration and the eventual 
transition of control over political society. 
What one should be cautious of while reading Dr. Roy is that her take on civil 
society could be misconstrued to suggest an inherently oppositional element (in conflict 
with political society) operative in an inevitable or binary contest of hegemony. This is 
                                                        
41 A Gramsci. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. [Edited/Translated: Q Hoare, G Smith]. International 
Publishers. 1971. p. 235. 
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not something Dr. Roy suggests specifically, but it is something that could be inferred 
without background familiarity with Gramsci. On the first, although civil society can be a 
‘weapon against capitalism,’ as mentioned in the previous paragraph it can also function 
as a reinforcement mechanism for existing hegemonic social and economic structures 
reflective and supportive of political society- which could be capitalist. On the second, an 
important note about processes of hegemonic reconfiguration is that Gramsci never used 
the term “counter-hegemony,”43 though his strategies pointed toward obvious 
revolutionary objectives.  
Instead of drawing from Dr. Roy to conceptualize civil society as a battlefield in 
which two dichotomous entities clash until one submits to the other, a better metaphor 
would describe it as a playing field where numerous teams compete. Rather than a two-
party war (which can exist but only superficially characterizes competition), a 
renegotiation of the complex relationships of hegemony occurs. This idea can be linked 
to Cox’s discussion of Machiavelli and reinforces Gramsci’s notion of civil society being 
an,  
“Ensemble of organisms… wherein the functions of hegemony comprise 
spontaneous consent given by the great masses to the general direction imposed 
on social life by the dominant group and the apparatus of state coercive power 
which legally enforces discipline on groups who do not consent.”44  
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Although Dr. Roy does not develop her interpretation of Gramsci’s civil society further 
than a few pages, her portrayal of him offers an introduction that extends beyond 
simplistic presentations of his platitudinal ‘hegemony’ or ‘war of position’ concepts.  
Edward Said provides a philological approach to Gramscian concepts, which— 
from a methodological perspective— is instructive for novice readers of Gramsci. His 
perspective is one aided by knowledge of the Italian language and exposure to Gramsci’s 
earlier work in Ordine Nuovo.45 As a scholar of comparative literature with keen 
appreciation for linguistics, Edward Said’s primary interest with regard to Gramsci was 
the meaning of discourse and how intellectual work could be elaborated into a mass 
belief. In other words, how ideas become active and how actions reflect ideas.  
This provides the conceptual undertones for Said’s concern about the reasons for 
defeat of ‘subaltern’ voices of the ‘Orient’ by orientalism.46 Using Gramsci’s hegemony 
as a point of departure, Said characterizes how a complex of educational practices and 
institutions— whose object was to create mass consent to a particular world view— 
resulted in cultural hegemony and gave orientalism durability.47 What is most fascinating 
about Said’s research and use of Gramsci is that it related directly to his lived experience 
and personal ambition to raise up the marginalized voices of persons from the Middle 
East. In other words, he applied Gramsci’s concepts not as a general theory but as a 
practical guide for action.  
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The instructive value in Said is that he duplicates Gramsci’s methodological 
approach. Said takes it to heart when Gramsci says,  
“The starting-point of critical elaboration is the new consciousness of what one 
really is and is ‘knowing thyself’ as a product of the historical process today, 
which has deposited in you an infinity of traces, without leaving an inventory… 
and therefore it is imperative at the outset to compile such an inventory.”48  
 
In parallel, Said’s Orientalism is, “an attempt to inventory the traces upon [himself], the 
Oriental subject, of the culture whose domination has been so powerful a factor in the life 
of all Orientals.”49 This is important for novice readers because it guides them toward 
appreciation for the ways in which Gramsci employed his concepts, prompting them to 
step beyond superficial appreciation for them in abstract.   
Stuart Hall, also important because of his methodological approach, offers several 
innovations. In the first case, having thoroughly digested the body of Gramsci’s work, 
Hall categorizes Gramsci’s concepts on the basis of how much attention and development 
they received. So, for example Hall gives, ‘pride of place to civil society [and] relegates 
the concept of hegemony because hegemony is a notion not well developed.’50 Although 
Hall was not pretentious enough to suggest his methodological approach was superior to 
others’, this creates an interesting point of comparison to works that seem to 
operationalize concepts on the basis of relevance rather than Gramsci’s own emphasis. 
This could be a point to make about Laclau and Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist 
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Strategy Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, although it is generally agreed that the 
hegemony they elaborate is a far departure from Gramsci’s.  
Another intriguing component of Stuart Hall’s work is that it adheres closely to 
Gramsci’s emphasis on the historicity of his concepts: the notion that his concepts are 
meaningless in the abstract and can only be fully developed when elaborated through 
historical circumstance and with regard to specific conjunctures. As an example of this 
exercise, it is worth examining briefly Stuart Hall’s work on Thatcherism from the late 
1980s. Hall begins his article with the suggestion that the conditions in Britain were,  
“Strikingly similar to those Italy when fascism had defeated the workers 
movement in a struggle for ideological dominance… [and] that the conjuncture 
for this struggle for a new ‘common sense’ was the ‘organic crisis’ of the British 
economy and society owing to the oil crisis, massive debt and consequent 
inability to pay for the welfare state.”51 
 
What results from analysis of Hall’s work is a best usages guide for the practical 
application of Gramsci: a guide’s guide. It is because of Hall’s emphasis on the centrality 
of civil society in Gramsci’s work that from here out, civil society will receive the bulk of 
attention.  
One recent scholar to write about civil society in the Middle East used Gramscian 
frameworks to present an insightful empirical argument. J Leigh Doyle describes in her 
article how western conceptualizations of civil society have shaped the way civil society 
is imagined existing in the Middle East, contributing to the problematic belief that 
democratization is possible if only western countries support civil society organizations 
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in the Middle East. Using Turkey as a case study, she argues that contrary to the 
dominant view which equates civil society with democracy, civil society organizations in 
the Middle East often assist elites, extending and consolidating their political and 
economic power.52  
Similar to the categorizations introduced by Dr. Roy, Doyle articulates a liberal 
conception of civil society by referencing Alexis de Tocqueville who argued that 
associations provided ordinary citizens with the power to prevent ‘either tyranny of 
parties or the whims of princes.’53 But instead of framing civil society from a Gramscian 
perspective in solely oppositional terms, Doyle’s is more nuanced. Here, Doyle 
references Joseph Buttigieg who suggests that,  
“Political society and the bureaucratic structures of the state can, and do intervene 
in civil society and, far from being necessarily opposed to the state (as with the 
liberal-democratic understanding) civil society is embodied with class relations 
and is thus very often its most resilient element; it is [the] arena wherein the 
ruling class extends and reinforces its power by nonviolent means.”54  
 
Doyle’s approach to Gramsci, in this sense, is important because it demonstrates how 
civil society can perpetuate authoritarian resiliency— despite what Western policymakers 
with liberal conceptions of civil society might think. This perspective does not supersede 
optimistic notions of civil society as a playing field in which ideologies compete and 
hegemony can be challenged. Rather, it presents an important reminder to readers that 
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Gramsci did not see civil society as only a weapon for the subaltern, he saw it as being 
accessible by a swath of competitors: including the subaltern but also the existing 
hegemon.    
Joseph Buttigieg, responsible for the most recent translations of Gramsci’s Prison 
Notebooks— and also father to Presidential Candidate Pete Buttigieg— offers a theory 
oriented and incredibly thorough discussion of Gramsci’s civil society in his 1995 article. 
In it, Buttigieg provides important insight for how Gramsci’s civil society should be 
applied, understood, and interconnected with his other concepts. For example, the 
suggestion that drawing excerpts from isolated and particular passages on civil society 
without contextualizing them in Gramsci’s other and extensive discussions on the topic is 
fraught with problems.55 He also contributes nuance to earlier mentioned discussions on 
the topic and argues that Gramsci’s civil society is dynamic and not one directional. 
Perhaps most importantly, with reference to Gramsci’s Southern Question, Buttigieg 
emphasizes that,  
“While appearing to favor the seemingly common interests of industrial capital 
and the industrial labor force, the government protectionist policies were, in 
reality perpetuating the misery and exploitation of an enormous segment of the 
population in the South, who remained trapped in a quasi-feudal socioeconomic 
system.”56  
 
This last point is especially important because it draws attention to processes within civil 
society that can be co-opted by the state in order to present the guise of protection for 
members of subaltern classes, while in fact consolidating their own authoritarian rule.  
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While the publications surrounding Gramsci are vast and entail varying 
methodological approaches, those mentioned here provide a starting point and guide. 
What remains absent in scholarly literature is the application of Antonio Gramsci’s 
methodological strategies to describe civil society in Jordan. More precisely, the 
application of Gramscian concepts and methodologies as a means of identifying and 
registering institutions within Jordanian civil society responsible for perpetuating 
authoritarian resiliency, so that they can be undermined. This requires acknowledgement 
of the historical similarities between the experiences about which Antonio Gramsci 
wrote, and the social, economic, and political circumstances of Jordan today, as well as 
an account of the interrelatedness of Gramsci’s other concepts. This is a task that will 
require reference to Gramsci directly, but for the purpose of a literature review it was 

















CHAPTER THREE: VALUE-CENTERED ANALYSIS AND DEMOCRATIC 
INDIVIDUALITY 
 
As was indicated with reference to trends in scholarship surrounding patron-
clientelism in the Middle East, studies in contemporary political economy sometimes 
center on value-free analysis. Neutrality is pursued in the sense that rather than 
challenging institutions like patron-clientelism, attempts have been made to demonstrate 
their dynamism, ie. tendency to function along non-linear, both morally positive and 
problematic axes. This trend is particularly true for LR de Elvira, et al.’s Clientelism and 
Patronage in the Middle East and North Africa: Networks of Dependency. Their efforts, 
as illustrated with the concept of networks of dependency, suggest that patron-clientelism 
has the potential to serve a mutual benefit for both patrons and clients. Rightly, it 
indicates how— at least in a marginal sense— the client is as important in serving the 
needs of the patron as the patron is in serving the needs of the client. This analysis falls 
short, however, of registering the advantages of patron-client relationships in comparative 
terms. In other words, LR de Elvira et al. do not categorize or emphasize ways in which 
patron-clientelism operates as a self-reinforcing mechanism that, on one hand, serves the 
immediate short-term needs of a client, while on the other, solidifying the long-term 
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position and influence of the patron, ie. the systemic consequences that are not morally 
neutral. 
The problem with this kind of analysis is that it falls short of identifying particular 
ways and circumstances in which patron-clientelism can be damaging, in terms of 
broader prospects for social mobility and political development. It poses itself as 
apolitical by instead reflecting upon the various ways in which patron-clientelism 
manifests, without challenging the effect of those manifestations. One can speculate 
about the reasons for this type of analysis, and in terms of academic rigor it makes sense 
that literature would avoid sweeping condemnations of historically and culturally 
engrained institutions. It would also be distinctly orientalist for Western scholars to 
comment on these institutions with the suggestion: if only you broke ways with these 
backwards traditions, your prospects for economic and political development would 
improve— you could be like us.57 But something different is taking place in this analysis. 
Reference to important thinkers like Said, Gramsci and Marx will show that literature 
about politics is in its nature political, and thus carries with it an either explicit or implicit 
value judgement with regard to historical circumstances and behavior. It is therefore 
possible to identify, from a perspective of moral objectivity, historical circumstances and 
behavior that are problematic, and demonstrate concretely the ways in which they are so. 
With specific regard to patron-clientelism in Jordan, that is the task of this thesis.  
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The reason for this discussion here is that it categorizes the current project in 
relation to existing literature. It presents the simple argument that in a particular 
circumstance patron-clientelism functions in particular ways that foment barriers to entry 
into the political process, preventing broader opportunities for political development. The 
results of these manifestations of patron-clientelism are authoritarian resiliency, ie. 
solidification of existing socio-political structures and perpetuation of subalternity for 
non-elite classes. In other words, this project— in contrast to contemporary scholarship— 
presents a claim related to the morally objective value of patron-clientelism in Jordan. 
Using models from Said, Marx and Gramsci, a negative moral value will be attributed to 
prominent forms of patron-clientelism. This, of course, is something very different than 
suggesting patron-clientelism has universal morally negative implications. Such a claim 
would be essentialist and equally problematic alongside benign representations of patron-
clientelist dynamism. Instead, this discussion is intended to present a kind of self-
awareness in terms of the scope of its analysis and effect, while also offering unequivocal 
moral determination. 
Taking a step backwards, the presupposed argument here is that literature about 
politics is inherently political. This is a claim attributable to both Antonio Gramsci and 
Edward Said. For Said, Western scholarship about the Orient demonstrates how political 
scholarship is incapable of presenting ‘pure,’ (apolitical) knowledge and reflects a power 
contest that exists on an uneven field of political domination. Further elaboration is 
helpful.  
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In the simplest terms, Said defines orientalism as “a way of coming to terms with 
the Orient based on the Orient’s special place in European Western Experience.”58 
Although by ‘Orient’ Said refers primarily to Arabs and Islam (what can be referred to 
loosely as ‘Middle Eastern and Muslim cultures’), the concept is not limited to geospatial 
or religious typology. Encompassing both, it refers more importantly to the relationship 
between, on one hand, Arabs and Islam, and on the other, the West, represented by 
literature. In other words, Said’s orientalism is a relational means to understand the 
distinction between Orient and Occident, the distribution of geopolitical awareness into 
texts and interests related to control, manipulation and incorporation reflected by texts.59 
At a broader conceptual level, it is analysis of discourse that is produced and exists in an 
uneven exchange between various kinds of power. 
Said describes a dialectical relationship between Orientalists— that is, scholars 
writing about the Orient— and the orientalist body of work they contribute to. In parallel, 
a dialectic also exists between the ensemble of relationships that compose global political 
hegemonic power and literature or discourse that surrounds those arrangements of power. 
In other words, when an author produces literature about the Arab and Muslim world, he 
is either consciously or subconsciously affected by literature that came before his own 
and either consciously or subconsciously complicit in forwarding the objectives of what 
came before him. Said defines this as ‘strategic location:’ the way of describing an 
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author’s position in a text with regard to the Oriental material he writes about.60 This 
leads to operation within self-perpetuating frameworks, in which the relationships 
between groups of texts (Said’s ‘strategic formation’) acquire referential power and 
thereafter gain influence in culture at large.61 
The result of this series of relationships is the production of what Said calls 
‘political knowledge.’ What he means by this is that the knowledge reflected in literature, 
in his case about the Orient, is both a representation and extension of real-world power. 
This is not to suggest that political knowledge is inherently bad; Said admits that his own 
intellectual endeavors have political value. Rather, Said argues that intellectuals should 
stop trying to fool themselves by believing their work is ‘pure,’ uninfluenced by 
arrangements of hegemonic power. What is most important is the type of meta-
consciousness and self-awareness referred to earlier. All work is bound to have some 
implication for power and be influenced by power— that is the dialectical relationship 
between author and literature/literature and real-world power. Only by acknowledging 
that component of academic life can academic endeavors be legitimized.  
The absence of this academic self-awareness— what in platitudinal academic 
discourse is called positionality— is twofold. In the first case it leads to the production of 
exteriority representation. “Orientalism is premised upon exteriority, that is, on the fact 
that the Orientalist, poet or scholar, makes the Orient speak, describes the Orient, renders 
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its mysteries plain for and to the West.”62 What Said is describing is the manufacturing of 
an image, by the West and for the West, of something different from the West so that it 
can be digestible in the West. It is the process of putting the Orient into terms accessible 
for a Western audience, a process which has the effect of producing something altogether 
different from the Orient itself. In contrast to ‘natural depictions’ of the Orient, these 
representations respond more to agreed-upon codes of understanding for their effects and 
the culture that produced them than their putative object.63 This presents a tangible way 
to think about how and why orientalism is manifest. It is manifest in ways that reaffirm 
its audience’s sophistication and cultural hegemony. It manifests this way because it 
assumes of those ‘lesser Orientals’ that they are incapable of representing themselves, 
and therefore the task must be undertaken by those with greater sophistication, ie. the 
West. This offers an apt example of how scholarship is not only political in that it 
reinforces and aggrandizes its own cultural hegemony, but also of how value judgements 
are implicit within it.  
The second result of scholarship without awareness, the logical next step of what 
was described in the preceding paragraph, is that it becomes increasingly detached from 
reality. Scholars operating under the assumption that what they produce is ‘pure’ or 
apolitical knowledge ignore the series of relationships described above and the ways in 
which those relationships shape scholarship. “The general liberal consensus that ‘true 
knowledge’ is fundamentally non-political (and conversely that overtly political 
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knowledge is not true) obscures the highly organized political circumstances obtaining 
when knowledge is produced.”64 One could extrapolate from Said a warning about the 
risk faced by scholars oblivious to ways real-life power dynamics shape their work. If a 
scholar is unaware of his position within a scholarly corpus, or of the ways in which that 
body affect his work, then he is unable to control for that influence. Unwittingly, he 
continues contributing to the body— as that body continues influencing him— while the 
body and scholar together are unhampered in devolution toward greater absorption with 
representational frameworks suited for the needs of their audience. This is a process of 
increasing detachment from reality because it is a process absent of actors standing in the 
way of detachment from reality. At a point,  
“Knowledge no longer requires application to reality: knowledge is what gets 
passed on silently, without comment, from one text to another… Ideas are 
propagated, disseminated anonymously, repeated without attribution; they have 
literally become idées recue… what matters is that they are there to be echoed and 
re-echoed uncritically.”65  
 
This is perhaps the worst type of scholarship: that which is political but unaware; that 
which contributes to a particular end but does not realize; that which becomes so self-
absorbed and uncritical that its only bearing on reality is the unintentional reinforcement 
of existing structures of political domination.  
Related to the question at the outset about the inherent political quality of 
scholarship surrounding politics, Said is both insightful and instructive. His registry helps 
categorize the ways in which relationships that constitute real-world power shape 
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discourse, how actions and ideas reflect one another. He helps characterize what happens 
when scholars are unaware of their situation within existing structures of cultural 
hegemony and become unwitting mechanisms of reinforcement. And, he explains how 
this process in total foments an uncritical approach to reality- eventuating detachment 
from reality. This is precisely what the project at hand seeks to avoid. With regard to 
Elvira et al., one could make the criticism that they present an uncritical view of reality, 
one that does not challenge existing manifestations of patron-clientelism. Thus, their 
work provides a neutral register of ways in which patron-clientelism exists without 
emphasizing why those manifestations are harmful or reasons why they should be altered. 
This project, in contrast, seeks to present its case in such a way mindful of the influences 
of Western hegemony and to step beyond the unexamined assumption that institutions in 
Jordan are as they will be. By demonstrating how particular manifestations of patron-
clientelism are harmful it will show both why and how changes in the institutions and 
relationships that represent existing global political dominance are essential. 
Antonio Gramsci’s perspective related to the political nature of scholarship has a 
critical underlying theme equal to that of Said’s— in fact, Gramsci’s model provided 
impetus for Said’s work. Although the literature he produced is sometimes understood 
only as a guide for socialist strategy, a closer read reflects something more nuanced. His 
approach, one could argue, is a register of risks and opportunities related to particular 
historical circumstances. Risks were important for Gramsci to discuss because they 
helped explain why the communist party in Italy was unsuccessful in thwarting the rise of 
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Mussolini fascism. Opportunities were valuable for discussion because they presented 
strategies for what the communist party in Italy could have done differently.  
Underlying these operational components of Gramsci’s theory, however, is a 
forceful critique of the liberal/capitalist state and its claims of universality, exposing 
mechanisms and modulations of power within it.66 In short, Gramsci’s perspective is 
eternally critical; the risks and opportunities he describes with reference to particular 
historical circumstances are constantly interrelated with the object of challenging and 
changing the status quo. The reason for his critical approach to reality is worth unpacking 
and will help explain why he saw scholarship— education, more fundamentally— as 
political, with essential import to the revolutionary reorganization of existing 
relationships and structures constitutive of hegemony. 
Two concepts Gramsci discusses at length, both which help readers understand 
processes whereby the plane of civil society can be exploited to wrest cultural 
dominance: intellectuals and education. Intellectuals, for Gramsci, constitute a 
demographic expanded beyond common conception; they are represented not only by 
what one thinks of as a ‘traditional’ academic— ie. professional intellectual— but also 
include the thinking and organizing members ‘organic’ to each class. In this sense, ‘all 
men are intellectuals,’ but not all men have the function of intellectuals in society.67  
                                                        
66 J Buttigieg. “Gramsci on Civil Society.” Duke University Press. 1995. p. 3-4.  
 
67 A Gramsci. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. [Edited/Translated: Q Hoare, G Smith]. International 
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The key distinction for Gramsci between intellectual and non-intellectual is a 
simple fact of the direction in which their specific professional activity is directed, toward 
intellectual elaboration or simple muscular-nervous effort.68 In simpler terms, Gramsci 
seems to distinguish between intellectuals and non-intellectuals on the basis of ideational 
intentionality attached to physical acts, pointing toward particular political end. One who 
functions as an intellectual in society contributes to the critical elaboration of intellectual 
activity, modifying its relationship with the muscular-nervous effort69 towards a new 
equilibrium, ensuring that the muscular-nervous effort itself, in so far as it is an element 
of a general practical activity, which is perpetually innovating the physical and social 
world, becomes the foundation of a new and integral conception of the world.70  
In other words, and in close correspondence with the earlier discussion about 
Said, an intellectual serves the function of aligning actions with ideas framed upon a 
critical approach to the status quo. He is the driver of innovation, the ‘mover and shaker’ 
who directs whatever professional activity is his specialty toward the organization and 
cultivation of a particular hegemonic arrangement. Solidarity or momentum gained by 
any particular intellectual current— which elaborates a particular critical worldview— 
reflects the zero-sum competition of civil society and the prospect of hegemonic 
reconfiguration.     
                                                        
68 Ibid.  
 
69 This Gramsci reference which includes second mention of ‘muscular-nervous effort’ reiterates the 
relationship he saw for intellectuals between actions and ideas. Their purpose was to coordinate the two in 
pursuit of a particular political end, either in support or opposition to existing hegemonic configurations. 
 
70 A Gramsci. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. [Edited/Translated: Q Hoare, G Smith]. International 
Publishers. 1971. p. 9. 
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While the traditional intellectual also serves the role of elaborating a worldview 
so that actions are brought into alignment with the ideas and interests of a particular class, 
he is not organic to a particular class. “Traditional intellectuals experience through an 
‘esprit de corps’ their uninterrupted historical continuity and their special qualification 
and thus put themselves forward as autonomous and independent of the dominant social 
group.”71 Therefore, “one of the most important characteristics of any group that is 
developing towards dominance is its struggle to assimilate and to conquer ‘ideologically’ 
the traditional intellectuals.”72  
The reasons for assimilating or co-opting traditional intellectuals might seem 
obvious, but are not exclusively related to the threat they would pose as a subversive 
element. By drawing them into the camp, so to speak, intellectuals can be employed as 
the deputies of the dominant group— or whichever group hopes to be dominant. As such, 
they exercise the functions of social hegemony and political government which comprise 
the spontaneous consent given by the masses of the population to a general direction 
imposed on social life, and the apparatus of state coercive power which legally enforces 
discipline on groups who do not consent.73  
The assimilation of traditional intellectuals is vital for dominant social groups and 
challenger groups on two planes: 1) the process of elaborating a worldview that then is 
disseminated as an organizing element in civil society for the purpose of ‘manufacturing 
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73 A Gramsci. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. [Edited/Translated: Q Hoare, G Smith]. International 
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consent’ is one which can either support or contradict existing hegemonic ordering. It 
would be impossible for a challenger group to alter significantly the existing hegemonic 
order while ideologies and interests reflective of the dominant group were upheld and 
consented to by the masses. 2) In the case of a challenger group, a war of ideas could be 
won in civil society so that the consent of the masses reflects a new critical worldview 
subversive to the existing hegemonic order. But, even if that is the case deputies are 
needed to serve the bureaucratic functions of the state when a transition in responsibility 
for governance— ie. control over political society— occurs. Rather than training a new 
cadre, it is better to co-opt the old.  
So, the value of intellectuals, both organic and traditional, is practical. Their work 
serves to either solidify ideological support for the dominant fundamental group as well 
as to carry out bureaucratic functions in political society over which it presides, or to 
elaborate a critical worldview in the process of organizing opposition to the existing 
hegemonic order. With regard to both functions, one could extrapolate that intellectuals’ 
agency—ie. their role in support or opposition to the existing hegemonic order— extends 
to and is reflected by the scholarship that they publish.  
Gramsci believed that science (encompassing scientific literature produced by 
traditional intellectuals) was an inherently political activity because it, “transforms men 
and makes them different from what they were before… it enlarges their concepts of life, 
raises to a higher level life itself.”74 This point is as true for assimilated intellectuals (by 
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the fundamental dominant group) as oppositional intellectuals because even a ruling class 
aims to “raise the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral level 
which corresponds to the needs of productive forces for development.”75 It would appear, 
therefore, in alignment with the earlier discussion about Said, that the production of 
scholarship is necessarily a political activity pointed toward one of the two ends 
attributed here to intellectuals.76 If Gramsci is correct, one cannot view scholarship as 
simply a benign representation of life. Rather, it implicitly or explicitly has something to 
say about life, either reinforcing and enhancing the existing structure of relationships and 
institutions that compose the hegemonic order or challenging them.   
Education relates to the role of intellectuals in two ways. First, in a purely 
mechanistic sense wherein, “the more extensive the area covered by education… the 
more complex the cultural world, the civilization, of a particular state.”77 This has more 
to do with the development of an ethical state— one which seeks to elevate its population 
in correspondence to needs related to development and production— by assimilated 
intellectuals than activities directed toward hegemonic reordering carried out by 
subversive intellectuals.  
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76 Suggesting ends of intellectuals in dichotomous terms is not the same as saying intellectuals remain in 
either oppositional or supportive groups. An oppositional intellectual could be assimilated to the 
fundamental dominant group, and vice-versa. In other words, the function of intellectuals is dynamic and 
therefore their association as assimilated or oppositional does not enable a fixed registry that transcends 
historical circumstance. This is an important point for the later discussion of patrons as intellectuals. 
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A ruling class would hope to empower its intellectuals in the development of a 
robust education system, one which produced subsequent intellectuals to carry out 
increasingly diverse and sophisticated functions of the state. But this can also mean that a 
ruling class— one responsible for articulating the ‘areas covered by education’— could 
prevent the emergence of subversive currents from within the ranks of its educational 
apparatus. This was true for Italy’s universities described by Gramsci:  
“The universities, and all the institutions which develop intellectual and technical 
abilities, since they were not permeated by the life of the parties, by the living 
realities of national life, produced apolitical national cadres, with a purely 
rhetorical and non-national mental formation.”78  
 
In this sense, assimilated intellectuals through their educative functions specify the scope 
of education provided to students in order to serve and protect the needs of the ruling 
class. This can mean simultaneously the development of productive functions within the 
state and suppression of ideas counterintuitive to the state. Education, in this framework, 
represents a tool in the same way the function of intellectuals is a tool in either service or 
opposition to the existing hegemonic order.  
The second way in which education relates to the role of intellectuals has more to 
do with the process of re-education, a foundational consideration in development of 
oppositional strategies. It is essential to realize, here, that disillusionment with existing 
structures reflective of hegemonic order and willingness to use force to upend them is not 
enough to affect revolutionary change in industrially advanced, modern states. 
Intellectuals, especially those organic to particular social groups, play a role not only in 
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organizing support for ideologies oppositional to the state but also in educating the 
masses so as to cultivate an alternative form of consent— that is, consent to alternative 
ideologies oppositional to those of the ruling class.  
This is an important point because for Gramsci, revolutionary activity had little or 
nothing to do with inciting people to rebel; instead it consisted in a painstaking process of 
disseminating and instilling an alternative ‘forma mentis’ by means of cultural 
preparation— intellectual development and education— on a mass scale, critical and 
theoretical elaboration and thoroughgoing organization.79 Organic intellectuals are 
essential in this process because, in the first case, they reflect the feelings and lived 
experiences particular to their class, attach ideas to those feelings and organize action. In 
the second case, because of the “higher level of social elaboration, characterized by a 
certain directive and technical capacity… not only in the limited sphere of his own 
activity but in other spheres as well,”80 the organic intellectual is suited to expand 
interests beyond corporate or class spheres and be an organizer of ‘masses of men.’81 
Without the organic intellectual, cultivation of oppositional ideologies and interests in 
order for consent to be manufactured at a degree of critical mass eventuating 
revolutionary change is impossible. Their role in the extension of class or corporate 
interests beyond those spheres reflects the re-education process, without which challenge 
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to existing hegemonic ordering— direct confrontation of the state apparatus by force— is 
futile. 
Gramsci’s thinking about the role of intellectuals and education is interrelated— 
one could even say dialectical. But the argument to be drawn from these concepts and 
applied to the overarching discussion about political scholarship is a simple one.82 No 
intellectual effort is benign. Either an intellectual has been assimilated within the 
relationships and structures reflective of hegemonic ordering in a particular historical 
circumstance, or he is operating in opposition to them.  
The work intellectuals produce thus reflects a process of education that either 
serve the interests of the status quo or stand in opposition to it. Scholarship offers just one 
example of the ensemble of conduits through which educational processes can take place, 
but one should be left with the understanding that it is never neutral. If taken seriously, 
the positions of Gramsci and Said should compel intellectuals (of all sorts) to consider the 
effect of their work. With regard to commentary on patron-clientelism, what hegemonic 
structures do scholars contribute to or oppose by emphasizing its dynamism rather than 
its dangerous ramifications? What value statements about the status quo do they express 
or stand alongside, either wittingly or unwittingly? Here is the point at which a moral 
barometer becomes necessary, at which a concluding discussion of moral objectivity 
becomes relevant.  
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There are competing models one can use to characterize historical circumstances 
and behavior in ‘morally objective’ terms. Alan Gilbert in Democratic Individuality 
categorizes several in order to expound a Marxian ethical model. For example, Adam 
Smith’s idea of moral progress centered on a capitalist economic structure in which, a 
“chain connection existed between accumulation and workers wellbeing.”83 One can 
extrapolate from his perspective a positive value— in terms of moral objectivity— 
attributed to circumstances and behavior that advance capitalist accumulation. But this 
framework implies the existence— and perpetuated existence— of two classes with 
distinct life chances, reducing personality to appropriate class activities.84 In other words, 
notions of moral objectivity drawn from Adam Smith presuppose inequity and anticipate 
its amelioration only as an indirect result of the fulfillment of its foremost objective: 
accumulation.  
Applied to the subject at hand, one could argue that because patron-clientelism 
facilitates employment, enrollment in schools, development of social capital via inter-
tribal or inter-familial relations, its productive function serves the same end important for 
capitalists. In this register, the possibilities of patron-client structures excluding those 
without resources from entering them or acting as barriers for participation in political 
spheres— upholding elites, sustaining the subalternity of non-elites— are 
inconsequential. Patron-clientelism could still be registered in morally positive terms, so 
long as it serves a productive and accumulative end. Because this notion of ‘moral 
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objectivity’ validates— or at the very least, registers as negligible— prospects of 
marginalization and political injustice, it is an inadequate ethical model.  
Marx’s nonrelativist, nonhistoricist model of ‘moral objectivity’ is nuanced in the 
sense that it synthesizes instrumental and intrinsic goods, utilitarianism and individual 
rights. For him, a dialectical relationship between behavior and historical circumstances 
reflective of instrumental and intrinsic goods explains his “utilitarian extenuation of 
capitalism, his indictment of its exploitiveness, his concepts of social individuality and 
distribution according to need.”85 Instrumental goods are those that contribute to the 
limited present, such that broader ultimate individual self-realization occurs at the 
expense of the contemporary producing class.86 The effect of an instrumental good is one 
which contributes to the elaboration of a higher good than that achieved by the limited act 
or process itself. Capitalism can be registered in terms of an instrumental good because as 
it advances through phases of development, proletariat exploitation and revolutionary 
fervor intensifies; the former instigates the latter, the latter reflects the fact of the former. 
An intrinsic good, on the other hand, is a good for its own sake, eg. struggle by the 
oppressed to emancipate themselves. Progress reflective of neither intrinsic nor 
instrumental good is called by Marx ‘alienated progress.’    
Marx’s position can be registered in terms of a response to the utilitarian, for 
whom salience is attributed to the fact that human nature is modified through historical 
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achievements, ie. different phases of economic development.87 Bentham, for example, 
provides a relativist approach in which value judgements about behavior take into 
primary account the influence of historical circumstance. But Marx attributes an equal 
and interrelated weight to human creativity and intelligence, meaning man is capable to 
understand his historical circumstance, himself within it, and able to reshape both.88 It is 
not the case that man’s behavior is solely a result of whatever historical circumstance he 
finds himself within, nor that circumstance necessarily follows as the result of human 
behavior. Instead, mutual and interrelated influence affects both processes— that is, 
processes of human action and history’s movement forward. 
If one were to compare the two models just introduced, one could say that 
utilitarianism tends to work in an opposite direction than Marxian ethicism. A utilitarian 
would argue that man’s pursuit of his own interests, the act of him accumulating personal 
wealth, has the eventual effect of raising the level of economic existence for his 
community. Selfishness and zero-sum competition are extenuated because their result 
is— in a vague sense— a collective advantage. But in this ethical framework, no 
mechanism is incorporated capable of elevating members of subaltern classes who, 
without prospects for accumulating their own wealth, are written off as being unlikely to 
affect the overall wellbeing of their community. Social individuality, how they and their 
productive potential are viewed, is delimited to their class. Only through sufficient 
enough accumulation would societal level, class transcendental change occur so that the 
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individuality of subalterns could be realized. Worse, this ‘sufficient enough 
accumulation’ is not an end intentionally pursued by productive classes in order to 
elevate the existence of their community; rather, it is the eventual surplus the productive 
class would be incapable of consuming so that bestowing it upon the subalterns is the 
only alternative to wasting it. 
From the opposite direction, Marxian ethicism begins with incorporation of 
egalitarian recognition, at least in broad political terms, for the lives of individuals.89 It 
centers on acknowledgement of the intelligence and productive potential of individuals, 
while realization of their personal interests occurs simultaneously, or in reflection of the 
realization, of the interests of their broader community. In this context, it is not the case 
that individual endeavors to accumulate wealth represent instrumental goods in the sense 
that they might later elevate the prospects for a communal or historical existence 
reflective of an intrinsic good. Rather, individual productive endeavors reflect an intrinsic 
good insofar as they serve the interests of the community because community and 
individual interests are one and the same.  
The model that Marx uses to exemplify this notion is that of the Paris commune, 
in which “reforms occurred simultaneously alongside longer-term political mindedness, 
manifest in assertions of democratic internationalism… an elevated sense of self-worth 
and purpose and an overall political environment framed upon cooperation.”90 In other 
words, democratic individuality relies upon an individual’s outward notion of his 
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interests alongside those of his community and the ability to align both interests 
unencumbered by the constraints of capitalism. Instrumental goods, then, are only those 
that advance the possibility of such an alignment— an alignment representative of an 
intrinsic good. Other instances of productivity, for example those mentioned earlier with 
reference to ways in which utilitarian models would register effects of patron-clientelism 
in positive value terms, represent alienated activity. 
The essential import of this discussion is that it determines standards by which the 
nature and effect of particular behavior can be measured, and equally, how particular 
historical circumstances reflective of particular behavior can be measured. With regard to 
patron-clientelism, one could argue that by standards of utilitarianism its effect of 
accessing employment, education and social-capital serves a productive end— an 
instrumental good in the sense that its productive outcome could at some later point serve 
communal interests. But productive, precisely, for whom? It would make little difference 
to a utilitarian if the access granted by patron-client relationships served exclusive social 
groups, so long as productive and accumulative processes continued. The problem with 
this perspective is that it diminishes the severity in risk of productivity by an elite class 
determined to uphold their elite status and sustain the subalternity of non-elites. If it is 
true that patron-client relationships serve a productive end, but the community at large is 
excluded from benefits characteristic of that end, a greater good is not being served. It is 
also not the case that the individual advantages accessed via patron-client relations are 
necessarily reflective of a later potential or intention to champion community wellbeing.  
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The stronger ethical model, Marx’s, acknowledges the limited effect of benefits 
accessed through patron-client relationships, as well as the fact that entrance into those 
relationships rarely occurs with intentionality toward communal wellbeing. This is 
important not only to characterize the ethical shortcomings of patron-clientelism as it is 
currently understood, but also to indicate its alternative potential— its potential from an 
alternative frame of mind. Marx’s perspective is therefore essential for extending the 
critical postures represented by both Said and Gramsci.  
In other words, yes, it is true that scholarship is political and yes, it is also true 
that there are competing ethical models one can hold against historical circumstances or 
behavior to express judgement. The question becomes: which model is most compelling 
to understand and characterize facts of the status quo thoroughly and work toward its 
betterment. Utilitarianism falls short of appreciating nuances of individuality, and by 
extrapolation, nuanced individual instances of patron-clientelism; it therefore offers no 
serious impetus for challenging the problematic manifestations of patron-clientelism. 
Marxian ‘moral objectivity,’ mindful that particular manifestations of patron-clientelism 
serve neither instrumental nor intrinsic goods, provides foundation for a critical approach 
to analysis of its prevalence in Jordan. This serves the ultimate end of this thesis which is 
to rethink and redirect patron-clientelism so that ‘conditions can be created for a 
consensual society wherein no individual or group is reduced to subaltern status.’91 
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CHAPTER FOUR: ANTONIO GRAMSCI AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
The value of a thorough discussion of civil society, one that precedes dissection of 
the tangible manifestations and effects of patron-clientelism in Jordan, is to make the 
following argument: a) patron-clientelism is one institution amongst an ensemble of 
institutions, relations and associations that comprise ‘civil society’ in Jordan. b) The 
institutions, associations and relations that comprise civil society in Jordan are considered 
as such— that is, are considered component parts of civil society— because of their 
political agency. c) Political agency reflected by processes within civil society do more to 
characterize civil society than the fact of these processes occurring in a ‘private sphere’, a 
space distinct from political society.92 d) Because civil society is characterized more on 
the basis of the activity that takes place within it than where that activity takes place, its 
component institutions, associations and relations simultaneously reflect and define it. If 
these points are true, patron-clientelism can be used to understand civil society in Jordan, 
its nature, the ways in which it intertwines private and public spheres and the direction of 
political agency that predominates within it.  
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On a deeper level, activities and processes attributable to civil society reflect not 
only the fact of civil society, but also the political dominance held by a fundamental 
social group and its auxiliary groups, ie. the monarchy, the political elite, etc. So, patron-
clientelism is an institution that reflects simultaneously the fact and character of civil 
society in Jordan, as well as the overall nature of political dominance. This is the 
overarching theme of this section. For purposes of elaboration, Antonio Gramsci’s model 
of civil society will be relied upon as a guide.  
It would be difficult to present comprehensive analysis of the ideas developed by 
Antonio Gramsci, but for the purposes of this chapter there are three themes worth 
discussion. These themes will be used to support the argument from the previous 
paragraph and clarify how it is possible for one institution— ie. patron-clientelism— to 
reflect and define civil society in Jordan, as well as indicate the direction of political 
agency within it, parallel to overall arrangements of political dominance. These three key 
themes are: a) dynamism and complexity, b) necessity of unification/universalization and 
c) cultivation of critical culture. Not only do these themes help explain political agency 
within civil society, but they also will contribute to the argument in the subsequent 
chapter detailing how existing institutions can be redirected for the purposes of 
reconfiguring political dominance.  
One could say about Antonio Gramsci that a fundamental innovation of his 
contribution to political theory is the fact of its complexity. This begins with his 
characterization of the state as something more than a monolithic, bureaucratic and 
coercive entity— ie., the state as a monopoly of legitimate violence. Two key points are 
    
55 
 
important to develop Gramsci’s state. First was the argument drawn from Daniel 
Halevy’s Decadence da la liberte that the most significant events in French history were 
due to initiatives by private organisms, not by political organisms deriving from universal 
suffrage.93 The second argument emerged in response to Ferdinand Lassalle’s notion of 
the ‘State as Gendarme,’ which was— from Gramsci’s perspective— a phase in a state’s 
evolution toward regulated society, but one that is self-eliminating by design.94 Both 
arguments have several implications. In regard to the first, the agency and saliency of 
private organisms necessitated for Gramsci a conception of the state that encompassed 
non-governmental institutions and activities. This does not diminish the possibility of an 
apparatus of state coercive power able to legally enforce discipline on those groups that 
do not consent either actively or passively— to a point.95 But it implies the limit of 
conceptualizing a state on the sole basis of its coercive element; that is, to neglect the 
sphere of culture, of hegemony, of spontaneous consent. Gramsci’s state, in other words, 
includes what one would think of as the traditional sphere of government, but also a 
separate sphere representative of the thoughts and feelings of the masses. The 
combination of this latter ‘ideological’ sphere alongside the former coercive element 
leads to Gramsci’s general formula: state = political society + civil society.96 
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With regard to Lassalle, emphasis on a state’s protective functions is both 
problematic and instructive. Gramsci’s idea of an ethical state was one that put an end to 
the internal divisions of the ruled and created a technically and morally unitary social 
organism.97 Gramsci imagined the realization of such a political existence occurring 
through the following process: passage from,  
“A phase in which state will equal government and state will be identified with 
civil society to a phase of the state as nightwatchman, ie. of a coercive 
organization which will safeguard the development of the continually 
proliferating elements of regulated society and which will therefore progressively 
reduce its own authoritarian and forcible interventions.”98  
 
In other words, after a war of ideas has been waged in civil society and a reconfiguration 
of hegemonic relations has taken place, government will reflect the state in the same way 
the state reflects civil society. This will present an initially precarious moment for 
whichever social groups are responsible for hegemonic reconfiguration, and a coercive 
state element will be necessary to ensure pockets of dissent are not able to mount 
counter-revolutionary assaults. Here, the protective and coercive state is also essential so 
that ideas reflective of the new hegemonic arrangement— ie., ideas pointed toward 
regulated society— can take root. As these ideas become prominent/hegemonic— and 
this is the point of contention between Gramsci and Lassalle— the need for a coercive 
state apparatus diminishes and the state itself becomes increasingly reflected by a 
regulated society.  
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Gramsci problematizes Lassalle’s gendarme state because for Gramsci a coercive 
and protective state is only a pathway to a higher level of social existence. The coercive 
state is not reflective of an end by itself but is rather a means more or less valuable 
depending on the historical circumstance. Therefore, applied as an overarching definition 
of state— one ill-equipped to explain state processes and functions beyond those related 
to protection, and one for which notions of advancement toward an ethical state do not 
correspond with diminished reliance on force— Lassalle’s gendarme is inadequate. The 
instructive value in Gramsci’s discussion of Lassalle is that it brings attention not only to 
different concepts of state, but also to different manifestations of political power. On one 
hand, he concedes that under certain circumstances force will be necessary, ie. the initial 
post-revolutionary moment just mentioned. But on the other hand, Gramsci’s civil society 
introduces into readers’ consciousnesses the idea of political change being affected— 
fundamentally, initially— in the realm of ideas. The earlier discussion of intellectuals and 
education begins to illustrate how this process occurs.  
The overarching point which the example of Gramsci’s state contributes to is that 
Gramsci injected nuance into models and labels used to understand political 
circumstances and behavior; this is especially true for civil society and ways in which 
political outcomes can be cultivated from within it. Related in more concrete terms to the 
subject at hand, this requires understanding civil society in Jordan, not as something 
permanently one-directional or delimited on the basis of location, but rather as a 
something dynamic and all-encompassing— or, at least with the potential to prompt all-
encompassing political change. In alignment with the four-tiered argument outlined at the 
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outset of this section, this analytical approach demands consideration of how institutions 
and activities (patron-clientelism) within Jordanian civil society reflect the nature of civil 
society— ie., its general trajectory— and interests of dominant fundamental social 
groups. Equipped with an understanding of how social forms can reinforce themselves, 
one can develop an informed critical posture toward existing hegemonic configurations 
so that reconfiguration is possible. 
An important discussion from Gramsci that extends this theme— ie. the endeavor 
to register the intricacies of political life vis-à-vis particular institutions, civil society, the 
state in general— is his notion of caesarism. While caeserism itself relates to a historical 
moment where conflicting forces in hegemonic competition balance each other so as to 
eventuate internecine destruction and an either progressive or reactionary intervention 
must arbitrate resolution,99 one can extrapolate some of Gramsci’s descriptive terms. For 
instance, when Gramsci suggests it would be an error in method to conceptualize 
caesarism as the result of an equilibrium of the fundamental forces, and that one must 
also see the interplay of auxiliary forces,100 this notion has broader applicability to social 
forces that emerge from civil society.  
Earlier the argument was made that intellectuals either are or are not contributors 
to the existing hegemonic arrangement. This is true in terms of post-hoc characterization 
appropriate for intellectuals or for the political party— what Gramsci called ‘the 
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collective intellectual’— but one must be careful to avoid falling into the idea that social 
forces originate in such a way that can be categorized in binary terms— ie., hegemonic 
and counter-hegemonic. This would be a misleading characterization for two reasons. In 
the first case, social groupings do not form on the basis of intentional support or 
opposition to existing hegemonic arrangements. Rather, they form on the basis of 
relations of forces: “The level of development of the material forces of production 
provides a basis for the emergence of the various social groupings, represents a function 
and has a specific position within production itself.”101  
Gramsci would argue that social groups form first at the economic-corporate level 
and gain awareness of their own situation and interests in relation to the existing 
hegemonic arrangement only after passing through a process of political maturation. 
Having matured, “one becomes aware that one’s own corporate interests, in their present 
and future development, transcend the corporate limits of the merely economic group… it 
marks the decisive passage from the structure to the sphere of superstructures; it is the 
phase in which previously germinated ideologies become ‘party.’”102  
The process through which social groups form, cluster and develop into parties is 
not one, therefore, that originates as a coherent, broadly relatable challenge of existing 
relations of hegemony. It begins with interests that are much more intimate, diverse and 
dynamic. Because of this intricacy, it would be misleading to suggest that processes of 
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hegemonic reconfiguration occur with regard to agreement or disagreement about the 
same interests, in binary, dichotomous competition. With regard to Gramsci’s 
caesarism— which, one could appropriately label as a moment in processes of hegemonic 
reconfiguration occurrent in civil society— his mention of auxiliary groups alludes to the 
complexity within civil society generally. To neglect this complexity within civil society 
would be to misrepresent it and misunderstand its processes. 
The second reason why binary notions of hegemony and counter-hegemony are 
unproductive is because hegemony itself represents a process. To suggest a hegemon and 
counter-hegemon would be to suggest that the process of hegemony has been completed. 
That would mean the ideologies of the dominant fundamental social groups had been 
thoroughly disseminated, that the material forces of production reflected their interests 
and, similarly, that political and civil society reflected consent to their leadership. Under 
this circumstance, one could imagine a rebellion, an oppositional force versus an 
incumbent force, a hegemon and a counter-hegemon.  
But Gramsci describes the cultivation and diminishment of hegemony differently. 
As far as cultivation of hegemony occurs,  
“The life of the state is conceived of as a continuous process of formation and 
superseding of unstable equilibria between the interests of the fundamental groups 
and those of subordinate groups… in real history these moments imply each other 
reciprocally… combining and diverging in various ways.”103  
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Gramsci provides no examples of hegemony realized in total as a permanent thing, but 
instead draws attention to particular moments of hegemonic arrangement. These he uses 
to articulate opportunities and risks within particular circumstances for political change. 
The diminishment of hegemony, on the other hand, occurs as the dominant fundamental 
group no longer expands, fails to assimilate new elements and begins to disintegrate.104 
These processes, of hegemonic cultivation and diminishment, do not appear strictly 
reactive to one another— as hegemony vs. counter-hegemony implies. Instead they 
appear much more to be the result of fundamental groups’ ability or inability to meet the 
needs of subordinate groups; or, in other words, the consent a fundamental group is able 
or unable to garner in civil society. 
These notions of state and caesarism, therefore, carry similar lessons about both 
Gramsci’s methodology and the complexity of hegemonic competition in civil society. 
Related to the complexity of hegemonic competition in civil society, it is important to 
reiterate that Gramsci saw the longevity of any particular hegemonic arrangement as a 
matter in constant relation with the satisfaction of interests of subordinate social groups. 
This implies a perpetual competition within which as one cluster of dominant 
fundamental groups increasingly neglect the interests of subordinate groups, those 
subordinate groups become more likely to assert themselves or appeal to other larger 
groups and be assimilated by them. This notion will become especially important in 
discussions of the role of patrons in the next section.  
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In terms of broader methodological application, two lessons emerge: In the first 
case, Gramsci’s state and caesarism represent a tendency to look deep within social or 
political phenomena to identify points of origin of interests. This reflects a bottom-up 
approach to understanding— a necessary account of the nuances within— formation of 
social groups, of parties and of aspirations for altering existing arrangements of 
hegemony. It would be impossible to characterize these various processes— that is, the 
various ways various groups vie for dominance— in strictly binary, dichotomous terms. 
Secondly, one can infer from the present discussion the insufficiency of analysis centered 
on only the functional attributes of patron-clientelism. Besides, the wealth of scholarship 
referred to in the literature review has sufficiently categorized historical functional 
manifestations of patron-clientelism. More important, to channel Gramsci, is a registry of 
the various ways in which patron-clientelism functions in the service of particular 
fundamental groups and, likewise, determination of whether those services also satisfy 
the interests of subordinate groups. This links back to the conceptual theme of this 
chapter that institutions and processes of civil society reflect the prominent direction of 
political agency within it, as well as of the state generally.  
The second conceptual theme derived from Gramsci, also one that helps 
understand civil society in terms of how its institutions reflect the interests of the 
dominant fundamental groups as well the means through which those institutions can be 
redirected, is that of unification and universalization. The process through which socials 
groups mature toward party life was introduced earlier, but further understanding for 
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what happens in the absence of unification can be drawn from Gramsci’s Some Aspects of 
the Southern Question.  
Gramsci’s bones of contention with the Italian communist party during the 1920s 
indicated by his remarks on the Italian south are twofold. The Turin communists— ie. 
northern Italian communists and spokesmen of communism in Italy, generally 
speaking— held the position that the success of communism in Italy depended on 
emancipation of the northern proletariat from capitalist slavery so as to then later 
emancipate the southern peasant masses.105 This they saw as essential in order to increase 
southern agricultural production and orient northern industrial production toward work 
which promoted peace and brotherhood.106 But the first problem, related particularly to 
the Turin communists, was that despite calls for north-south solidarity, their attitudes 
toward southerners represented the influence of bourgeoisie education.107 ‘Southernist’ 
literature emanating from Northern communists reflected a pejorative frame of mind 
toward the south, characterized southerners as ‘biologically inferior beings’ and the south 
as Italy’s ‘ball and chain that prevented social development.’108 So one of the 
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preventative factors impeding the Turin communists from unifying with their southern 
counterparts was the problem of how to modify the political stance and general ideology 
of the proletariat as a national element unconsciously subjected to the influence of 
bourgeoisie education.109 In Gramsci’s mind, for the proletariat to become capable of 
governing— for unification to be possible— it needed to strip itself of corporatism and 
prejudice.110 
The problem of north-south unification was, at its core, one related to the 
influence of an institution that shaped attitudes and ideologies to the advantage of the 
fundamental dominant social group. Having been subjected to bourgeoisie education, 
northern communists developed subconscious prejudices against the south and believed 
that southern emancipation was only possible with northern assistance. In other words, 
the northern communists believed they needed to do for the southerners what the 
southerners could not do for themselves. This also implied the priority of northern 
emancipation because to attempt emancipation alongside or in collaboration with the 
southerners would be to jeopardize its potential for success.  
This serves an apt example to extend the discussion from the last chapter about 
the political function of intellectuals and education. The effect of bourgeoisie intellectuals 
and processes of education that took place in Italy during the 1920s had definitive 
political outcomes. In Joseph Buttigieg’s commentary, it caused “civil society to became 
                                                        
109 Ibid. p. 173.  
 
110 A Gramsci. The Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916-1935. [Edited by D Forgacs.] New 
York University Press. 2000. p. 174. 
    
65 
 
sick, culturally impoverished, politically impotent, lacking the moral fiber to resist 
demagogic onslaught.”111 Ultimately, the forma mentra— the general cultural frame of 
mind, the attitudes and ideas prevalent in Italians— cultivated through education by 
Italy’s dominant fundamental social group fomented prejudice and disunity that 
eventuated the failure of the communist party.  
As a broader thematic result of communist disunity in Italy, and one related to 
Gramsci’s second criticism of Italian communist strategy, southern marginalization 
perpetuated economic circumstances that reinforced the prevalence of ‘old types of 
intellectuals.’112 This is a more complex problematic and helps explain the relationship 
between what Gramsci called the structural and superstructural elements of society. 
Because Italian communist strategy in the 1920s centered on northern emancipation as a 
presupposition to the empowerment of the south, communists did not aggressively pursue 
division of big estates in the south. Similar to the advice they gave the workers at Fiat and 
Reggio Emilia, the Turin communists believed transfer of ownership— in the case of the 
factory workers from their board, in the case of the southern peasants from their 
landowners— to cooperative management would leave the workers reliant on the 
bourgeois state.113  
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In the case of the factory workers they saw Fiat being cut off from institutions of 
credit controlled by the bourgeoisie, thus placing the workers at the mercy of the 
bourgeoisie and turning the Turin proletariat into an appendage of the bourgeoise state.114 
For the southern peasants, they saw no value turning unskilled workers loose on 
uncultivated land without tools or credit from landowners. A 3 January 1920 passage 
from L’Ordine Nuove probably not written by Gramsci affirms:  
“Without Machinery, without accommodation on the place of work, without 
credit to tide him over till harvest-time, without co-operative institutions to 
acquire the harvest (if— long before harvest time— the peasant has not hung 
himself from the strongest bush or the least unhealthy-looking wild fig in the 
undergrowth of his uncultivated land!) and preserve him from the clutches of the 
usurers— without all these things, what can a poor peasant achieve by 
occupying?”115  
 
Awaiting northern emancipation in hopes of their own, southern peasants were 
solidified within a parasitic semi-feudal agrarian bloc. It consisted of three social layers: 
the peasants, an amorphous and disintegrated mass; medium rural bourgeoisie, the social 
group from which a majority of the southern intellectuals emerged; and, the big 
landowners. 116 Had the south matured beyond a feudal economic circumstance reliant on 
agriculture, to organize commerce its dominant class would have bred a particular type of 
intellectual organizer that specialized in applied science.117 This would have been 
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essential in order to remain competitive in advanced economic circumstances. Because 
this was not the case for the south, the old type of intellectual prevailed; he was the small 
landowner, the medium rural bourgeoisie.  
At this social layer— not far off from the peasant and in constant pursuit of 
upward mobility— the intellectuals derived a fierce antipathy to the peasant who they 
regarded as a machine for work to be bled dry, and one which can be replaced, given the 
excess of the population.118 In this arrangement, the southern intellectual served as 
intermediary between the peasant and big landowner, acting as land administrators, rent 
collectors or bureaucrats. (As an interesting side note, southern intellectuals, the 
intermediaries of the south, made up more than three fifths of the state bureaucracy, a 
striking parallel to the nearly 80 percent of Jordan’s GDP accounted for by its public 
sector.119) This created a,  
“Monstrous agrarian bloc, which as a whole functioned as the intermediary and 
overseer of Northern capitalism and banks; big southern landowners relied upon 
the Northern industrial bourgeoisie for machinery, tools, etc. Its single aim was to 
preserve the status quo. Within it, there existed no intellectual light, no program, 
no drive towards improvements or progress.”120  
 
Several important points can be drawn from Gramsci’s discussion of southern 
intellectuals. Because of prejudice and disunity within the communist party, no creative 
attempts were made to alter or improve the southern economic situation. No one in the 
north saw altering the southern economy as a necessary step to liberating southern 
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peasants because northerners were preoccupied with their own emancipation. So, the 
feudal bloc that remained— what Gramsci could have referred to as the ‘structure’ of the 
south— had a direct impact on the nature of intellectual the south produced and the type 
of organization that stemmed from him. This enabled the old type of intellectual just 
described to serve as an ordering element in society, to solidify in peasants’ minds their 
reliance on intellectuals as intermediaries, to cultivate a general ideology supportive of 
the status quo.  
These are what Gramsci would have referred to as superstructural elements that 
existed in a dialectical, reinforcing relationship with the economic structure. The fact that 
the communist party in Italy was unable to unify and dismantle the economic structure in 
the south meant that it was also unable to unseat the type of intellectual common in the 
south and the organization to be expected from the old intellectuals. One could speculate 
about what might have happened had large estates been transferred into co-ops and the 
relevance of old intellectuals had waned. This could have empowered a different— 
potentially oppositional— intellectual in the south, helped dismantle the agrarian bloc, 
undermined the northern bourgeoisie, and reduced the influence of the bourgeoisie in 
total. If that had been the case, perhaps the proletariat would have had greater success in 
becoming a national element and at preventing the rise of fascism.  
This discussion of unification and southern Italy is important with regard to the 
overarching topic of civil society because it demonstrates— again— complexity in terms 
of points of origins of interests as well as competition and relations between various 
social stratum. It also indicated how disunity prevents a movement from presenting a 
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serious challenge to the status quo. But more deeply, it shows how what happens in civil 
society— ie. what intellectuals gain prominence, what type of societal organization they 
make likely— is closely intertwined with economic circumstance. In the next chapter, 
when these ideas in abstract are given concrete examples with different manifestations of 
patron-clientelism, this will notion will apply directly. In the case of Italy, economic 
circumstances perpetuated the influence of intellectuals who worked more to sustain the 
status quo than to elevate the situation of the masses.  
Related to the fundamental argument of this chapter, that the agency of particular 
institutions reflect and define civil society as well as the overall nature of state political 
hegemony, it seems clear that the organizational role southern intellectuals played as 
intermediaries between peasants and landowners indicated a definite and representational 
institution. As mentioned, it reflected a similar intermediary relationship between the 
agrarian bloc in the south and the northern industrial bourgeoisie, and so the overall 
dominance of the bourgeoisie in general. These are the fundamental insights to be drawn 
from Gramsci’s Some Aspects of the Southern Question. Similar lessons will be 
discernable from Gramsci’s last important theme related to critical culture. 
The cultivation of critical culture, for Gramsci, is one of the essential steps toward 
hegemonic reconfiguration. It presupposes an understanding of the complexities within 
civil society, awareness of how institutions function within civil society in the direction 
of a particular political end and of how a unified effort can redirect them. But 
fundamentally, for Gramsci, a critical culture means that the state can be criticized, 
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“precisely in order to develop and produce new forms of state life.”121 This implies the 
development of a new outlook on political life, the conception of an ideational challenge 
against incumbent arrangements of hegemony and their products. Gramsci describes this 
as a cyclical process in which,  
“The development of the party and state into a conception of the world, ie. into a 
total and molecular transformation of ways of thinking and acting, reacts upon the 
state and the party, compelling them to reorganize continually and confronting 
them with new and original problems to solve.”122  
 
In order to fully understand this process, and the ways in which a critical culture 
can have the effect of reorganizing hegemonic relations, two points of consideration are 
relevant: first, defensive strategies that fundamental groups employ in order to prevent 
the rise of a critical culture that might jeopardize them; second, processes and 
mechanisms through which critical culture can be cultivated. 
One of the most striking references related to the subject at hand found in the 
Hoare/Smith edition of Gramsci’s prison notes is mention in a footnote of a speech given 
by Benito Mussolini on 26 May 1927. In the speech, Mussolini was addressing the 
question of whether opposition within a state was necessary in order to ensure efficiency 
of the state. This was his response: “Here the problem arises: but how do you manage to 
do without an opposition? Opposition is not necessary to the functioning of a healthy 
political regime. Opposition is stupid, superfluous in a totalitarian regime like the Fascist 
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regime.”123 Although Mussolini was speaking on behalf of a very specific type of 
hegemonic configuration, this sentiment can be extrapolated to explain the psychology of 
dominant groups in general. It would not be in the interests of the Italy’s Fascist 
government to participate in the cyclical process described above in which political 
circumstances— ie. particular hegemonic arrangements— came in repeated contact with 
new ways of thinking and then were forced to react and accommodate them. 
Totalitarianism itself implies the absence of accountability, so this would present a 
feeling of existential jeopardization. But put in more broadly relatable terms, it is in the 
interest of any dominant fundamental group that the interests of its members and 
auxiliary members are met by its party, precluding the need for them to appeal to other 
parties. Related to civil society, Gramsci suggests that “it always happens that individuals 
belong to more than one association… an ‘all embracing and unifying’ policy is aimed at 
ensuring that the members of a particular party find in that party all the satisfaction that 
they formerly found in a multiplicity of organizations.”124 A dominant fundamental group 
can ensure the needs of their members and auxiliary members are met by destroying or 
incorporating other organizations. This is one way in which the prevention of a critical 
culture can take place. 
But one would be remiss not acknowledge that this is a process with 
multidirectional application. It would be equally in the interest of an oppositional group 
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to meet the needs of as many subsidiary groups as possible in order to cultivate a ‘new 
culture’ with broad appeal. This relates directly to the recent discussion of the Italian 
south. Had the communists been able to unify in Italy, had their party gained control over 
industrial and agricultural means of production, it would have been in conflict with their 
interests to allow— say, for example— the continued functionality of bourgeoisie banks 
and creditors. This would position the bourgeoisie in such a way that would enable them 
to serve workers’ needs, increasing the likelihood of proletariat dependence on them and 
potential for workers to defect to the bourgeoisie camp. One could make a similar 
ideational argument in the abstract. If it is the case that oppositional intellectuals are 
cultivating a new culture critical to existing arrangements of hegemony, it would be 
counterintuitive to their interests to let themselves be assimilated by the dominant 
fundamental groups or be out shined by some conglomerate of competing oppositional 
intellectuals. This would quickly render their party useless. So, from two directions, as a 
defensive and offensive mechanism, a way of preventing the formation of a critical 
culture and a way of bolstering a new critical culture is by ensuring a party meets needs 
as broadly as possible, so that other supplemental parties are unneeded.  
A second way dominant groups can reinforce their position by making the 
emergence of new critical culture difficult is through the use of their negative coercive 
functions. Implied here is that this is not a multi-directional tactic available to rising 
oppositional groups because they would not have reached a point— when it would be 
necessary to defend their critical view of the state— where they would have control over 
both civil and political societies. Nascent social groups, as discussed throughout this 
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thesis, must first pursue success on the field of ideas in civil society, and only later can 
manipulate political society in reflection of their interests. One way dominant groups can 
apply institutions in political society to defend their ideational positions is through the 
negative educational function of the law. Gramsci suggested that, “If a state tends to 
create and maintain a certain type of civilization, and to eliminate certain customs and 
attitudes and disseminate others, then the law will be its instrument for this purpose.”125 
This should not be understood to mean that the law functions to punish people so as to 
force one particular frame of mind upon them. Rather, Gramsci saw the educative 
function of law as a means of preventing ‘cultural dangerousness.’126 In other words, if 
employed deftly, institutions in political society can be directed so as to shape the flow of 
ideas in civil society, ensuring they do not come into conflict with the forma mentra 
reflective of the existing hegemonic relations of the state. A similar theme can be 
extended from the discussion in the last chapter about education. Schools and 
universities, if given free range, have the potential to become hotbeds of oppositional 
thinking. But if controlled closely they become an extension of state bureaucracy; the 
bureaucratic hierarchy replaces the intellectual and political hierarchy.127 In the cases of 
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both law and education, a dominant fundamental group is able to employ functions in 
political society to influence ideas— in particular, critical ideas— in civil society.128  
From the opposite direction, there are several points to consider in characterizing 
ways a critical culture can be cultivated so that hegemonic reconfiguration becomes 
possible. This begins with the party. According to Gramsci, the role of the party is not to 
provide “simply a mechanical and passive expression of [its] classes, but react 
energetically upon them in order to develop, solidify and universalize them.”129 If the 
party— at least initially— reflects the interests of a particular class, the way in which 
those interests are articulated is likely to be in comparison with the status quo. If the 
needs of a particular class had already been met, the class would have been assimilated 
amongst the auxiliaries of a larger class and formation of a party would not have been 
necessary in the first place. So, the party— conceptualized as the collective intellectual— 
necessarily carries with it the function of cultivating a critical culture, one that views the 
product of the current arrangement of hegemonic relations lacking and itself as the 
purveyor of improved conditions. 
A related component in the cultivation of a critical culture, which offers 
specification to comparison of the status quo just mentioned, is for a newly rising social 
group to present an unequivocal critique of the past. When Gramsci describes the process 
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of a social group founding a new state, he suggests that initially the hegemonic content of 
that social group is predominantly of an economic order. In this circumstance the 
superstructural elements associated with this newly hegemonic social group are few in 
number, but the cultural policy they project must necessarily be a negative critique of the 
past.130 In other words, it is not enough for a newly formed social group to present an 
idea about economic reordering that they believe is more substantial than ordering of the 
present circumstance.  
Taking a step further, the new social group must present their economic ideas 
alongside a forma mentra that— while perhaps not fully conceptualized at the outset— is 
necessarily critical of the past. The example Gramsci gives of this going wrong is the 
mediaeval communes because despite their innovative ideas about economics, culture 
remained a function of the church; the church was anti-economic in character and so its 
culture was not directed toward allowing the communes to gain hegemony, but rather 
preventing them from acquiring it.131 This demonstrates that a new social group must 
ensure that its culture, the frame of mind and superstructural elements that contribute to 
its economic reasons for forming in the first place, is opposed to the status quo and 
critical of hegemonic arrangements of the past. Without this posture, potential auxiliary 
members will be unsure why the social group formed or uphold a cultural frame of mind 
counterintuitive to its existence.  
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As a party forms and aspires to dominance, attempts to cultivate as broad a base 
of appeal as possible, attempts to pose itself in contrast to the present and as an 
improvement on the past, another key aspect of this process is that it assimilates as 
principles of moral conduct the rules which will be legal obligations in the state.132 This 
is the final and overarching theme related to the cultivation of a critical culture so that 
hegemonic reordering becomes possible, but one that again involves the superstructural 
components of a party. In order for a rising party to gain significance and membership it 
is necessary for people join it, in the first case, because they imagine their immediate 
economic needs being met, and in the second case because they register its tenets, the 
core cultural platforms and ideas of the party as being morally palatable. This could 
require a re-education process, but if a compelling case is made against the past or the 
status quo, it would not necessarily be a difficult one.  
This links back to some fundamental themes of this chapter. In the first case, it 
serves as reminder that gains hoped for with regard to society as a whole or political 
society in particular are only accessible after a war of ideas in civil society has been won. 
It would be much more difficult to inculcate in people as principles of moral conduct 
rules that already existed through a top down approach reliant more on coercion than on 
the cultivation of consent. As Gramsci often repeats, coercion and domination by force 
are not the most effective means of control and subordination in society.133 This also 
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serves as a reminder that the content of civil society, the political agency that stems from 
actors within it, provides a clearer source of characterization for civil society than 
reference to its location. None of the discussions in this chapter would have gone very far 
if each one circled back to emphasis on behavior in a ‘private sphere’ in relation to 
overarching political circumstances. Instead, this chapter should have demonstrated that a 
significant interrelation exists between activity in what is called civil society, economic 
activity in a state, and the overall political circumstances of a state. To delimit these 
‘spheres’ into superficial and easily managed categories would be to overlook the 
intricacies of their intersectionalities.   
Ultimately, this chapter was intended to show that the relationship between civil 
society and the society overall, the relationship between civil society, are mutually 
reinforcing. Civil society can reflect the dominant fundamental social groups who hold 
sway over political society, can reinforce their position and can act in a preventative 
mechanism against the rise of opposition. On the other hand, civil society is the only 
place in which opposition to a state can originate, especially in advanced and modern 
economies. If these things are true, then defining civil society on the basis of anything 
other than its content— that is the political agency of actors within it— is to be 
superficial and reductionist. Understanding the complexity of civil society, its outward 
interrelation and the dominance reflected by institutions within it is essential.  
Related to the subject of patron-clientelism, this chapter should also demonstrate 
that more important than the different ways or spheres in which patron-clientelism 
functions is the outcome of that ensemble of functionality. In other words, patron-
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clientelism can serve purposes that cross political, economic and social spheres— all of 
which have attachments to civil society— but deeper analysis strives to uncover the 
product of that functionality. Realizing which direction that functionality points helps 

























CHAPTER FIVE: PATRON-CLIENTELISM IN JORDAN 
 
Taking into consideration the preceding chapters, one should not be left with the 
impression that concepts drawn from Gramsci offer ready-made explanations or solutions 
to contemporary problems in Jordan, related to civil society in general or patron-
clientelism in particular. Instead, as Buttigieg reminds us, Gramscian concepts, like those 
introduced here, should serve to animate inquiries into the present condition of civil 
society, offering clues of where to look.134 What follows is a characterization not of the 
different ways in which patron-clientelism functions, but rather the effect of its 
functionality. Several fundamental questions will need answering: 1) In Jordan, does the 
role of patrons in civil society— the salience of wasta— reflect and reinforce current 
overarching arrangements of political hegemony— ie. dominance of the monarchy, tribes 
and influential families— or operate in opposition to them? 2) Do economic 
circumstances in Jordan indicate likelihood of particular organizing elements or 
intellectuals predominant within civil society? 3) Is the ability of patrons to meet clients’ 
needs expanding or diminishing; what implications or opportunities does this reflect for 
the current hegemonic ordering?  
                                                        
134 J Buttigieg. “Gramsci on Civil Society.” Duke University Press. 1995. p. 32. 
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Before delving into these questions, as a conceptual presupposition, the remainder 
of this chapter will hold the function of patrons in Jordan parallel to the role of organic 
intellectuals; it will characterize patrons as intellectuals. This comparison is persuasive 
because both patrons and organic intellectuals elaborate a worldview that then is 
disseminated as an organizing element in civil society for the purpose of manufacturing 
or solidifying consent in contradiction to or in support of existing hegemonic ordering. 
Patrons in Jordan provide an organizational element in society in the sense that they 
establish the rules clients must play by in order to sustain their patron-client relationship. 
But these rules are not just imagined ad hoc, they reflect a historically engrained vertical 
structure that connects patrons operating at the lowest levels within civil society to the 
highest, and even into political society. Another point of similarity between the organic 
intellectual and the Jordanian patron is that, like the entrepreneur, the patron is well 
acquainted with knowledge and people that extend beyond his immediate corporate 
purview. A patron in Jordan is only as effective as he is able to serve the needs of his 
clients and so by necessity must be outward informed and oriented. Further points of 
comparison could be made, but for now others can be left to elaboration in later 
examples.  
As a secondary preliminary remark before engaging in a brief study of Jordan, 
justification for choosing Jordan is worth mentioning. The reasons are as follows: First, 
accessibility provided an incentive because interviews conducted between June and 
August of 2018 will be relied upon— in part— as primary sources for this chapter. 
Secondly, Jordan presents a unique study because it is a Muslim-majority state. This is 
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valuable because analysis of institutions in civil society helps demonstrate their salience 
in sustaining the existing social, economic and political order, compared to the imagined 
adverse implications of Islam. If, operating from the Islamophobic presumptions of 
orientalism that religion is inextricably linked to all aspects of life in Muslim-majority 
countries and thus religion is culpable for social, political and economic 
underdevelopment, Jordan is a good place to be proven wrong. Lastly, Jordan is situated 
at the heart of the Middle East and is deeply affected by the historic conflict between 
Israel and Palestine, as well as the more recent turmoil experienced in Iraq and Syria. 
One could describe Jordan as a cultural melting pot, with rich Bedouin and Palestinian 
heritage, and more recently an increasingly influential influx of Syrian culture. 
Interaction and differing stature between social groups, to include racial prejudice often 
imposed against Jordanians of Palestinian origin, contribute to a dynamic social 
environment rich for analysis. If something important can be understood about civil 
society and patron-clientelism in Jordan, it might provide a roadmap for analysis of other 
nation-state systems within the Middle East.  
Perhaps the easiest to answer of the three questions posed at the outset of this 
chapter is the second- the question relating to the overall economic circumstance in 
Jordan and what it means for the role of intellectuals. Jordan’s economic circumstance 
can be inferred best from reform efforts articulated by Marwan Muasher in his National 
Agenda: 2006-2015: The Jordan We Strive For. 135 It is important to note that this was a 
                                                        
135 M Muasher. “National Agenda 2006-2015: The Jordan We Strive For.” The Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan. 2005. 
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government document produced by Mr. Muasher during his tenure as the Deputy Prime 
Minister of Jordan and because of this document Mr. Muasher was dismissed. One could 
say about the termination of Mr. Muasher’s government employment that the ideas he 
proposed in order to boost economic efficiency would have jeopardized the otherwise 
uninterrupted political lives and practices of the ruling elite. Although this does not 
provide an example of patron-clientelism per se, it does reflect how institutions— in this 
case, norms related to behavior appropriate for government officials— shape ideas about 
common practices and marginalize ideas deemed uncommon. As an ultimate result of Mr. 
Muasher’s dismissal and the rejection of this document, many of the reform efforts 
pursued today relate to problems his report was— more than ten years ago— intended to 
address.  
Mr. Muasher’s report can be summarized with the following paragraph: Jordan’s 
continued economic and political improvement depends on the quality and effectiveness 
of its public administration. Major steps are required to develop a public service focused 
on delivery results and founded upon merit. The National Agenda aims to improve the 
quality of life for Jordanians, build a strong economy, and guarantee basic freedoms and 
human rights and strengthen democracy and cultural and political pluralism. The National 
Agenda is founded upon Jordan’s Constitution and a conviction that political 
development is implicit in comprehensive economic, social, cultural, and administrative 
development. Reforms directed by the Agenda must create a favorable investment 
environment, fiscal discipline, internal political stability, administrative development, 
justice accountability, transparency, labor policies, vocational training, employment 
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support, minimum wage, maximum working hours, economic competitiveness, freedom 
of capital movement, reduction of trade barriers, support for small and medium sized 
enterprises and quality education.  
Phase One of the National Agenda requires the formulation of regulatory 
legislation, elimination of discrimination against women, liberalization of state-controlled 
markets and investment in key infrastructure. Phase Two will promote capital-intensive 
industries and induce the newly educated workforce into value-added jobs. In this phase 
partisan life and political pluralism are expected to develop. In Phase Three selected 
economic sectors in the knowledge economy will be developed. 
  On can draw from this document that a sense of urgency was felt, then and to a 
greater degree now, on the development of domestic, self-sustainable industries, 
particularly with eventual emphasis on a knowledge economy. This is a reasonable 
response to the fact that Jordan’s debt as of 2016 reached $35.1b and represented 93.4% 
of its GDP.136 International factors, such as the influx of Syrian refugees and regional 
turmoil leading to a decrease in tourism, have accentuated Jordan’s economic 
vulnerability. But, as the report also indicates, a bloated and inefficient public sector also 
contributes to Jordan’s economic insolvency. This explains efforts to emphasize 
accountability, transparency and merit, and is also indicated by the fact that the public 
sector accounts for roughly 77% of Jordan’s GDP.137 
                                                        
136 K Sowell. “Jordan is Sliding Toward Insolvency.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2016. 
 
137 A Tadros. Personal interview conducted in Amman Jordan. 16 July 2018. 
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Acknowledging the obvious nuances as well as country and regionally specific 
particularities, the point of comparison against which economic circumstance in Jordan 
can be understood is the earlier discussion of southern Italy. Economic circumstances in 
southern Italy were such that there was not a significant push for intellectuals— both of 
the organic and traditional sorts— to pursue economic innovation. A stage of capitalism 
had not been reached in which they presented a necessity. Jordan now is scrambling to 
innovate and diversify its economy, harvesting as many capital producing, STEM 
oriented intellectuals as possible, but these initiatives are fresh and the entrenchment of 
old types of intellectuals is old.  
One could assume, then, that is more likely that the dominant body of intellectuals 
in Jordan continue to operate as they have, working counterintuitive to reform efforts and 
in support of the status quo. This presents an obvious tension between the economic 
structural elements in Jordanian society as they exist today, and what they need to 
become in order for Jordan’s economy to survive. This implies, that as economic 
circumstances are forced to evolve, the ability of patrons to serve the needs of their 
clients— of intellectuals’ ability to organize society in alignment with Jordan’s economic 
needs— will diminish. This reflects also the ability of the fundamental dominant groups 
to meet the needs of its auxiliary or subordinate groups and an opportunity that might 
emerge for hegemonic reconfiguration. 
Another conclusion to draw from the National Agenda and the fact of its rejection 
is that a problem of social unification existed at the time of its publication— and 
considering a lack of substantial reforms, probably remains in existence today. This links 
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back to the initial and causal element behind southern Italy’s poor economic 
circumstance, which led to the perpetuated existence of old intellectuals and regressive 
feudalistic norms. It was because of the northerners’ prejudicial ideas about southerners 
that the Turin communists were unsuccessful at elaborating a national ideology capable 
to unify the party. A point of comparison for Jordan, with reference to the National 
Agenda, is the role of women. Still a vastly patriarchal society, in Jordan women hold 
only fifteen percent of the national parliament;138 relatedly, seventy-four percent of 
Jordanians believe men are better at political leadership than women and fifty-eight 
percent also agree that husbands should have the final say in decisions concerning the 
family.139  
This seems to represent a similar disunity to that based on prejudicial thinking 
identified by Gramsci in the Italian south. In Italy, it was the case that because of a 
disdainful attitude toward the south, Turin, ie. northern communists were unable to 
elaborate a national platform that enable north-south unification. Because of this lack of 
unification, southern Italians were trapped in an anachronistic and semi-feudalistic 
economic structure that perpetuated their reliance on the bourgeois state. Similarly, 
antiquated gender norms in Jordan exclude women from its workforce and perpetuate 
economic circumstances that are at best unproductive and at worst on an inevitable 
collision course towards insolvency. 
                                                        
138 Proportion of Seats Held by Women in National Parliaments. The World Bank: The Inter-Parliamentary 
Union. 2018. 
 
139 H Ceyhun. “Jordan Five Years After the Uprising.” The Arab Barometer. 2017. 
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Related to the larger themes of this thesis, though, it means that institutions can 
and do create and shape norms that govern political behavior. It would be difficult to 
attribute prejudices toward women in Jordan to one causal root over others, but the thrust 
of this argument reinforces the claims made about the function of patron-clientelism in 
civil society. Patron-clientelism both reflects and shapes how people imagine politics 
functioning under normal circumstances. The fact of appealing to a patron to gain 
government access— for paperwork, privileges, etc.— is understood broadly as how 
politics in Jordan function. To push back against that system would be to act 
counterintuitive to a frame of mind engrained broadly in Jordanian society, in opposition 
to the social forma mentra. Acting outside systems of patron-clientelism would perturb 
the ruling elite because they would become immediately inundated by requests and 
concerns articulated by the broader public, as opposed to the public being funneled 
through patron networks on the basis of clients’ ability to access them. More importantly, 
if the broader public felt empowered to heir its grievances directly to the government, 
which incidentally is a right guaranteed by Article 17 of the Jordanian Constitution, 
solidarity could be realized and a significant challenge to the ruling elite could be waged. 
This offers one example of how patron-clientelism reflects an institution supportive of the 
dominant fundamental groups in such a way that debilitates popular political movements 
from below.   
The second and third primary sources important to consult in order to answer the 
questions outlined at the outset of this chapter both come from interviews conducted last 
summer. Both relate to the nature of education in Jordan, which provides an important 
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indication of how ideas are cultivated in society, but also how structures within society 
tangibly reinforce Jordan’s hegemonic arrangements. The first interview comes from an 
external perspective, a person not directly employed in academia, and discusses processes 
of admission at the University of Jordan. The second interview comes from a traditional 
academic and relates to how patron-clientelism influenced his prospects for employment, 
publication and tenure. These interviews will be used to explain how patron-clientelism 
in Jordan functions in the service of the fundamental dominant group— ie. the political 
elite, monarchy, members of parliament, etc.— as well as its auxiliary groups— ie. what 
could be referred to as the medium bourgeoisie, employees of the public sector.  
During the interview between Amjad Tadros140 and the present author, Mr. 
Tadros explained the effect of patron-clientelism on education and public sector 
employment in Jordan. He described that the admittance process to the University of 
Jordan was based largely on royal decree. The King determined the percentage of school 
seats available to children of members of the armed forces, children of members of the 
Ministry of Education and the children of parents employed by the UN. In simple terms, 
parents of an applicant— the wasta of the parents, or the parents’ patronage— had more 
to do with admittance than did test scores or other concrete measures of merit. The result 
of this system of admission prompted a situation in which students would enroll in 
classes but not have considerable interest or incentive to perform. If a student’s 
                                                        
140 Amjad Tadros is an entrepreneur and investigative journalist. He is the point person in the Middle East 
for CBS news and has managed the network’s coverage and operations in the region since 1990. In 2001 he 
was awarded an Emmy in investigative Journalism and in 2007 we received the Alfred Dupont Award for 
excellency by the University of Columbia. He was the co-recipient of the Peabody award in 2008. (source: 
IMDB) 
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underperformance resulted in poor grades, the student’s parents would appeal to the 
teacher, and again through the process of patronage, ensure their student would not be 
expelled. This resulted in a body of college graduates unemployable in terms of skills, 
again reliant on their parents to find jobs. Most often, this meant appointment to mundane 
ministerial positions. This, Mr. Tadros suggested, created a self-perpetuating cycle that 
contributed to Jordan’s bloated public sector.141  
This discussion with Mr. Tadros indicates that the accumulation of particular 
incidents of patron-clientelism can and do have system level implications. In the first 
case, it shows that institutionalized reliance on patron-clientelism in the process of 
admission to the University of Jordan creates a barrier to entry for applicants without 
parents employed in the public sector. For applicants from low socio-economic 
backgrounds, this means the likelihood of access to education is minimal. In the second 
case, persons employed by the Jordanian government, those whose children have a higher 
likelihood of access to education and post-graduate employment, have little incentive to 
suggest changes in admissions policies because they— or their children— will be most 
directly and negatively affected. One could suggest that this presents a system of free-
riding wherein the free-riders are most capable to change the system but to do so would 
be at the detriment of their ability to ride free.  
A tertiary but equally fundamental point to make about the system of patron-
clientelism in education that Mr. Tadros describes is that of the relationship between 
Jordan’s structural and superstructural elements. As mentioned earlier, a significant 
                                                        
141 A Tadros. Personal interview conducted in Amman Jordan. 16 July 2018. 
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portion of Jordan’s workforce is employed by the government. This represents a concrete 
economic circumstance— a structure— that the system of patron-clientelism— a 
superstructural element— reinforces. Also perpetuated in the minds of young Jordanians, 
what one could think of as a process of assimilation— another superstructural element— 
is the notion that through their parents’ patronage, employment is a given. This frame of 
mind, this cultural perspective, this forma mentra disincentives innovation, initiative and 
aspiration to something higher than a government job, for which salary is guaranteed and 
responsibilities are minimal.  
One could extrapolate how this relates to dominant fundamental groups and 
existing arrangements of hegemony. Tribes, for example, whose loyalty was integral to 
the formation of the Hashemite Kingdom and who continue to hold significant influence 
in Jordan today, have traditionally opposed privatization because they see in it possibility 
for corruption.142 Maintaining an educational system in which children of bureaucrats 
become bureaucrats serves the present economic arrangement in which the public sector 
dominates, as well as the perceived longevity of the current ruling elite. If, on the other 
hand, entrance to the education system became strictly merit based and performance was 
mandatory for continued enrollment, it is difficult to imagine ambitious graduates willing 
to while away their professional lives serving in non-demanding government jobs. This 
would upend the current relationship between Jordan’s economic structure and the 
superstructural elements that support it.  
                                                        
142 S Yom. “Jordan’s New Politics of Tribal Dispute.” Foreign Policy. 2012. 
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The second interview conducted this past summer offers a similar sentiment but 
from a more personal and opposite perspective— that of an academic. Akram Al-Deek143 
opened the conversation by saying in exasperation, “wasta affects everything in Jordan.” 
Dr. Al-Deek explained how upon his arrival he struggled to find appointment at a 
university, despite being credentialed in Europe and at a higher level than most of the 
people he competed with for employment. He described working tirelessly to contact 
Literature departments with job vacancies, but never heard back. Everyone had told Dr. 
Al-Deek that people who facilitate by means of wasta are those who are in power and are 
successful. This, he noted, was particularly true for tribes and members of parliament. 
But Dr. Al-Deek was opposed to the concept of patron-clientelism because he wanted to 
be responsible for his own accomplishments. As the semester approached and Dr. Al-
Deek became discouraged, his father went behind his back and contacted a friend who 
happen to be employed at the University of Jordan. Dr. Al-Deek was granted an interview 
and accepted a job offer shortly after.  
Some time passed and Dr. Al-Deek became frustrated with the system at the 
University of Jordan, so began looking for other opportunities. He happened to teach a 
workshop that the daughter of the owner of The Middle East University in Jordan 
attended; she forwarded his name to her father and he was offered employment. A few 
                                                        
143 Akram Al-Deek is the Vice Dean of the Faculty of Languages and Communication, Head of the 
Department of English Language and Literature and the Department of Translation. He is an Assistant 
Professor in World Literatures at the American University of Madaba, Jordan. Al-Deek was awarded a PhD 
in Post-Colonial Studies and Literature from Sunderland University in northern England. He is the author 
of Writing Displacement: The Politics of Home and Identity in Post-Colonial English Fiction. He is also 
the author of the fascinating recent article A Cultural Revolution or Renovation in Amman? which can be 
found here: http://www.jordantimes.com/opinion/akram-al-deek/cultural-revolution-or-renovation-amman 
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years later, Dr. Al-Deek’s friend began working at the American University of Madaba, 
he heard it was a more liberal environment with a better curriculum, and so asked her to 
put his name in with the dean. Again, Dr. Al-Deek was offered employment.  
With regard to publication, Dr. Al-Deek said that the process could be incredibly 
slow; if you submit a paper without knowing anyone it can get lost in a pile. He has been 
trying to publish a paper for the last year and has yet to hear a definitive response. The 
only exception to this all-encompassing influence of wasta that Dr. Al-Deek described 
was in regard to promotion. Wasta is still important for professors hoping to be promoted 
from Assistant to Associate, but that is not the case for professors moving from Associate 
to full professorship. The rationale behind this exception, he explained, was because 
professors at a higher level than Associate are rare and needed. For Associate professors 
hoping to become full tenured professors the likelihood is higher to be promoted without 
wasta and on the basis of merit. 
Ultimately, Dr. Al-Deek has attempted to resist the influences of wasta as much 
as possible. He realizes that wasta played an important role in his initial employment but 
has worked hard to build a name for himself so as to be responsible for his own 
accomplishments. He also realizes that he would probably be more successful if he 
succumbed to the system of patron-clientelism in Jordan. But this he said would come at 
a cost. In particular, he mentioned a previous landlord of his who had generously offered 
to provide anything Dr. Al-Deek needed for his apartment. It was only later that Dr. Al-
Deek realized his landlord’s cousin was enrolled in one of Dr. Al-Deek’s classes. The 
clear expectation was that Dr. Al-Deek would receive services from the landlord in 
    
92 
 
exchange for passing his cousin. This was a compromise in integrity that Dr. Al-Deek 
was unwilling undergo, and so was cautious not to make any requests of his landlord.144  
Several important points can be drawn from this interview with Akram Al-Deek. 
In the first case, it is striking that the same system of patron-clientelism that applies to 
students also applies to teachers. Without his father’s initial intervention, it would have 
taken Dr. Al-Deek considerably longer to find employment, if he had at all. For 
unconnected academics without resources, prospects for employment exist on an uneven 
playing field. This seems to have the structural implication that not only is the education 
system shaped in order to perpetuate circumstances that produce students to the 
advantage of the ruling elite, but also, teachers are equally swept into this structure and 
their behavior is shaped accordingly. If teachers are unwilling to participate in the system 
of patron-clientelism in order to access employment, publish scholarship or pursue 
promotion from assistant to associate professor, that would also imply their unwillingness 
to react favorably to parent patrons that attempted to pressure them. These are the types 
of professors that would find difficulty gaining employment.  
At surface level, this vignette indicates parallels to the claims made by Dr. Doyle 
about Turkey, referenced in the Chapter Two. In Jordan’s education system, a microcosm 
for broader political life in Jordanian civil society, it is the case that institutions— and 
patron-clientelism, more specifically— reflect and reinforce the interests of the ruling 
elite, the dominant fundamental social groups. This is indicated by the trends of 
education and bureaucratic employment described by Mr. Tadros. Although civil society 
                                                        
144 A Al-Deek. Personal interview conducted in Amman, Jordan. 13 July 2018. 
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has the potential to be weaponized by oppositional groups, it is also the case that it can 
function, in Gramsci’s words, as the ‘powerful system of fortresses and earthworks’ 
supportive of the state.145 
On a more nuanced conceptual level, however, one could say that Dr. Al-Deek 
represents an exception. If it is the fact that intellectuals are assimilated by the existing 
arrangements of hegemonic relations in order to benefit the dominant fundamental social 
groups, there are also those intellectuals— like Dr. Al-Deek— who choose not to play by 
the rules. It serves as a rebuke to the present system of education in Jordan that Dr. Al-
Deek does not use or act as a wasta. 
This links back to two fundamental themes of this thesis. Dr. Al-Deek represents 
a critical approach to the existing arrangements of hegemonic ordering in Jordan. But 
related to the non-binary nature of hegemonic competition described earlier, he does not 
oppose wasta necessarily because it is a representative of functions attributable to 
Jordanian government. It is true that patron-clientelism is an institution engrained in 
Jordanian social and political life, but Dr. Al-Deek’s bone of contention with wasta is a 
fact of integrity. He did not want to accept free services from his landlord because he 
knew that he would become indebted to the landlord and enable his landlord’s cousin to 
underperform.  
If one wanted to think about this from a moral perspective, the early discussion of 
instrumental and intrinsic goods offers a fair barometer. Accepting free services from his 
                                                        
145 A Gramsci. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. [Edited/Translated by Q Hoare, G Smith]. 
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landlord and passing the landlord’s cousin— even if she did not show up to class— 
would not present an intrinsic or an instrumental good. Absence of economic exchange 
that usually would be involved in the services procurement from a landlord would not 
serve any good to the landlord. Passing a student who does not show up for class because 
of that student’s connections does not serve any good. If anything, this would 
demonstrate an alienated good that in the long run would benefit neither Dr. Al-Deek nor 
his landlord.  
This also can be considered from the perspective of a relationship between a 
professor and a student. A professor who invests his heart in his teaching and forms a 
relationship with students based on mentorship and genuine interest in learning is one 
who takes his craft seriously. Such a relationship, such a means of instruction would 
represent an intrinsic good, a positive moral value. To willfully sacrifice that relationship 
and that intrinsic good in accordance with norms emergent from institutions designed to 
support the ruling elite would be a moral wrong.  
The more profound point to be drawn from this interview, though, is that 
oppositional currents can co-exist within institutions dominated by existing hegemonic 
arrangements. This is what Dr. Al-Deek represents. He represents disillusionment with a 
system, but ability to operate within it. Gramsci would argue that this is the only way to 
cultivate a critical culture within civil society and upend the existing arrangements of 
political dominance. Say, for example, that Dr. Al-Deek continues for the rest of his 
career to deny attempts by parent patrons to procure grades for their children which the 
children did not earn. Say Dr. Al-Deek was able to continue finding new employment, if 
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he wished, continue being promoted and continue publishing without reliance on wasta 
and instead reliance on his own merits. This behavior would be subversive to existing 
norms related to the function of education, the function of politics and the nature of 
Jordanian society in general and could represent a compelling starting point for the 
cultivation of a culture oppositional to the status quo.  
In a sense, a different sense than has been employed throughout the bulk of this 
thesis, Dr. Al-Deek begins to represent a different type of patron and a new intellectual. 
He as an instructor who refuses to act as a wasta draws students into a different type of 
patron-client relationship— one that is oppositional to existing norms and practices 
prevalent in Jordanian civil society. Realizing that grades would only be received from 
Dr. Al-Deek on the basis of merit, students could enter into an educational relationship 
with Dr. Al-Deek so that in exchange for their commitment to academic integrity they 
would receive from him genuine, rigorous and quality education. This would empower 
them to develop their own intellectual worth and ability to pursue educational 
opportunities beyond undergraduate education, so as to potentially become educators and 
patrons of their own. Once the value of this type of educational experience and pride in 
having achieved academic accomplishments independently was realized broadly, that is 
to say new institutions and frames of mind regarding education took root, the structural 
economic element in Jordanian society would be forced to react.  
In terms of the broader themes introduced in this chapter, patrons sharing 
functional similarity to intellectuals— represented particularly in the case of academia— 
demonstrate the salience of wasta as an institution that reinforces existing political 
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circumstances in Jordan and overarching arrangements of political hegemony. The 
economic circumstance in Jordan makes this a predictable reality. But there is both room 
and opportunity for these circumstances to be upended by oppositional intellectuals, 
which do exist— as Dr. Al-Deek represents. An irreconcilable tension exists between the 
current needs met by patrons and the economic development required for Jordan to 
remain solvent. 
This means that the immediate advantages of patron-clientelism for children of 
bureaucrats do not reflect a sustainable system capable of adapting to the inevitable 
economic advancement Jordan needs to undergo. This makes people like Dr. Al-Deek 
reflective of a new wave of patron, a new intellectual, capable of meeting the new needs 
of ambitious students hoping to be informed and innovative. One can draw the 
fundamental lesson from this section that despite the prevalence of patron-clientelism as a 
salient and organizing principle for civil society and society in general in Jordan, its 
current configuration is bound to erode. The new patron, the intellectual oppositional to 
political and economic circumstances reflective of existing arrangements of hegemony is 











CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
 
 
These chapters have attempted to develop new ways to think about political and 
economic circumstances in Jordan. They began with the argument that all literature 
surrounding politics carries with it either implicit or explicit value judgements. This 
served to push back against scholarship that emphasizes the dynamism of patron-
clientelism, as opposed to its potentially harmful manifestations. This last chapter in 
particular demonstrated ways in which patron-clientelism in Jordan stands in the way of 
intrinsic goods in order to sustain existing economic and political circumstances and the 
leadership of the political elite. This was intended to represent the various ways— across 
various fields— in which patron-clientelism excludes subalterns from the political 
process and sustains the status quo. It has been argued that a value position is worth 
taking on the subject of patron-clientelism in Jordan, and that the negative value 
attributable to its prevalent manifestations today represents an opportunity for tomorrow. 
 The fourth chapter dove deep into the concepts of Antonio Gramsci and helped 
provide a clearer understanding for civil society in Jordan. This was crucial as a 
precondition to understanding behavior in civil society and how circumstance shapes 
behavior. This section also was important to develop an understanding for the 
relationship between economic circumstances and superstructural elements in society like 
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institutions, norms and general cultural frames of mind. Related to the final section, this 
discussion of Gramsci also demonstrated how economic evolution in Jordan will occur 
only after institutions currently prevalent in civil society are realized to be insolvent.  
 The fifth and final chapter attempted to bring all of the conceptual themes 
together, demonstrating how patron-clientelims is a salient force in civil society reflective 
of the interests of the current hegemonic order. But the most important part of this thesis 
came from the interview of Dr. Al-Deek. The experiences he had represented not only 
what was wrong with institutions reflective of economic and political circumstances in 
Jordan, as well as the interests of its political elite, but he also represented Jordan’s 
opportunity. Rather than a basic representation of enthusiastic but fragmented 
oppositional currents in Jordan, Dr. Al-Deek represents how the inevitable economic shift 
in Jordan will carry with it a necessary reconfiguration of what patron-clientelism means 
and how it shapes behavior.  
 So, despite earlier criticism about optimism for revolutionary behavior in 
repressive political environments like Jordan, this thesis is itself optimistic. This is not 
just because of the valiant and oppositional efforts by people like Dr. Al-Deek, but 
because of the understanding developed here for the relationship between economic and 
institutional factors in Jordanian society. It is likely that more Al-Deeks will emerge, but 
it is even more likely that Jordan’s need for economic evolution will require it. Yes, 
currently patron-clientelism represents a morally problematic and regressive institution in 
Jordan’s civil society that generates and reinforces norms reflective of the interests of the 
dominant fundamental social groups. But patron-clientelism also presents an opportunity, 
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as it has the potential to one day reflect economic and political circumstances that are not 
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